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THE LIMITATIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN
DISCLOSURE REGIMES
ADAM S. CHILTON* & GALIT A. SARFATY†
Although the past few decades have seen numerous cases of human rights
violations within corporate supply chains, companies are frequently not held
accountable for the abuses because there is a significant governance gap in the
regulation of corporate activity abroad. In response, governments have begun
to pass mandatory disclosure laws that require companies to release detailed
information on their supply chains in the hopes that these laws will either
provoke companies to reform their practices themselves or create pressure
from stakeholders to improve corporate accountability.
In this Article, we argue that supply chain disclosure regimes are unlikely
to have a large effect on consumer behavior, and, as a result, their effectiveness
at reducing human rights abuses will likely be limited. This is not only because
scholarship on mandatory disclosure regimes in other areas has suggested that
these regimes are frequently unsuccessful, but also because these problems are
likely to be exacerbated in the human rights context. We argue that this is due
to the fact that supply chain disclosures do not provide information on actual
products, the information in the disclosures only provides weak proxies for
human rights outcomes, and the risks associated with supply chains vary
dramatically across industries.
In order to test our argument, we field a series of experiments that were
designed to test how well consumers understand supply chain disclosures. In
our experiments, the nationally representative sample of respondents
consistently rated disclosures reporting low levels of due diligence almost as
highly as disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence. Based on these
results, we argue that supply chain disclosure regimes designed to change
consumer behavior in order to reduce corporate human rights abuses should
be reconsidered.
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INTRODUCTION
With the globalization of business, firms are increasingly relying on thirdparty suppliers in countries plagued by weak governance. Although this trend has
provided economic benefits to workers in developing countries, recent tragedies—
such as the collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh—have
highlighted the potential of human rights violations occurring when firms outsource.1
These tragedies have occurred, in part, because there is a significant governance gap
with respect to the regulation of corporate activity abroad.2
In an attempt to fill this gap, international legal instruments have been
created over the past several decades to address the human rights conduct of

1
See Jim Yardley, Report on Deadly Factory Collapse in Bangladesh Finds Widespread Blame,
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/world/asia/report-on-bangladeshbuilding-collapse-finds-widespread-blame.html.
2
See, e.g., PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE (2014) (arguing that there is a
persistent governance gap in the regulation of the activities of transnational corporations acting in states
with weak governments).
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transnational corporations.3 Most recently, the U.N. Human Rights Council
unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in
2011.4 The Guiding Principles affirm the corporate responsibility to protect human
rights and outline remedies for victims of human rights abuses. These principles,
however, are voluntary and lack independent monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms. As a result, despite being well intentioned, these principles and the
other existing international standards have been ineffective in closing the governance
gap.
Given the shortcomings of international law, domestic legislation is
emerging as an alternative method for regulating the extraterritorial human rights
abuses of corporations. Within this shift to domestic law, governments are
specifically turning to mandated disclosure as a way of filling the governance gap.
Mandated disclosure regimes have gained traction, in part, because they are an
indirect method of regulation that faces less political resistance than other regulatory
techniques.5 These regimes aim to shape corporate behavior by using transparency
as a disinfectant.6 Recent disclosure regulations require companies to provide
information on their global supply chains, including due diligence measures that they
have undertaken to prevent human rights violations by third-party suppliers
(particularly slavery and human trafficking).
Although several laws that mandate supply chain disclosures regarding
human rights have been passed around the world, the first, and perhaps most
important, such law is the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA).7
The CTSCA requires companies to disclose their efforts to ensure that their supply
3
Existing standards include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ILO’s Tripartite
Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights, the U.N. Global Compact, and ISO 26000. See infra note 24.
4
See The U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, The UN Guiding Principles on
Business
and
Human
Rights:
An
Introduction,
2,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/Intro_Guiding_PrinciplesBusinessHR.pdf; see also
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Human Rights, Report of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, 3 (Mar. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter U.N. Guiding Principles].
5
Mandated disclosure is an example of a “new governance” regulatory mechanism that relies on
specific, inflexible mandates to change behavior. New governance mechanisms stand in contrast to
traditional command and control methods that are state-focused. The new governance model is
considered to be more flexible, participatory, and cost-efficient, and may promote more innovation and
tailoring to local circumstances. See generally Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004) (arguing there
has been a decline of the “regulation” and a rise of the “governance” model of government); Martha
Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229
(2003) (discussing the impetus for the move from public to privatized institutions that provide social
goods). For an application of new governance theory to international regulation, see Kenneth W. Abbott
& Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance:
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 541 (2009).
6
See Amitai Etzioni, Is Transparency the Best Disinfectant?, 18 J. POL. PHIL. 389, 398 (2010).
7
See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(a)(1) (West
2012) [hereinafter CTSCA, S.B. 657]. Another prominent supply chain disclosure law currently in force
is the Dodd-Frank Act’s section 1502, under which companies must report to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission on their suppliers’ use of conflict minerals. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213–18 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act § 1502].
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chains are free from slavery and human trafficking. The law affects millions of
consumers, given that California represents the world’s seventh largest economy and
the country’s largest consumer base.8 It has also served as the model for recent U.K.
legislation on supply chain transparency and proposals for a similar law on the federal
level in the United States and Australia.9
The hope of these laws is that stakeholders will be better able to pressure
companies to change their behavior if they have access to disclosed information or
that being forced to provide information will prompt companies to reexamine
questionable practices.10 For example, customers may consider information on a
company’s level of due diligence when making their purchasing decisions. Activists
and NGOs may use this information to exert reputational pressure as part of a
campaign for better sourcing and human rights practices among companies.
Investors may alter their investment choices on the basis of this information. Finally,
the requirement of disclosing information may lead companies to change their
behavior even without pressure being exerted by consumers, NGOs, or investors.
Although supply chain disclosure laws could theoretically influence
companies through any of these mechanisms, the laws have (at least primarily) been
crafted to compel companies to provide information targeted to consumers who are
making purchasing decisions. For example, the CTSCA was designed with the
intention that the content and format of the disclosures would be useful for
consumers.11 The guidance the state of California has released on the document
specifically notes that “[t]he Act is expressly intended to ‘educate consumers on how
to purchase goods produced by companies that responsibly manage their supply
chains,’ and therefore disclosures should be made in a manner that best serves this

8
See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A
RESOURCE GUIDE, i (2015), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/resource-guide.pdf
[hereinafter CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE].
9
See
U.K.
Modern
Slavery
Act
of
2015,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/contents/enacted; Business Supply Chain Transparency
Act
of
2015,
H.R.
3226,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/housebill/3226/text/ih?overview=closed [hereinafter Business Supply Chain Transparency Act]. The
Australian government has indicated a willingness to enact legislation similar to the CTSCA and
convened a Supply Chains Working Group to assess regulatory options. See Commonwealth of
Australia, Australian Government Response to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade Committee report: Trading Lives: Modern Day Human Trafficking (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=
jfadt/slavery_people_trafficking/report.htm.
10
See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 695 (2003); David Hess, Social
Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability
Through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 462 (2007); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89
GEO. L.J. 257, 262 (2001); Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Foreword: Making Sense of Information
for Environmental Protection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1359 (2008); Lobel, supra note 5, at 454–55;
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at 561.
11
See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at i (“A recent law in California is
poised to help California consumers make better and more informed purchasing choices. The California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act (Steinberg, 2010) (the ‘Act’) provides consumers with critical
information about the efforts that companies are undertaking to prevent and root out human trafficking
and slavery in their product supply chains—whether here or overseas.”). Id. at 1 (“The California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act, which became effective on January 1, 2012, empowers California
consumers to join the fight against human trafficking by giving them access to information about
retailers’ and manufacturers’ efforts to eradicate such labor practices from their supply chains.”).
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public policy.”12 As a result, companies are directed to design their disclosures to
provide information in a concise, structured, and easy to read format. In other words,
instead of providing the kind of comprehensive information that would be useful to
activists or investors, the law was designed to provide information that could change
consumer behavior.
In this Article, we argue that supply chain disclosure regimes are unlikely to
have their intended effect of directly changing consumer behavior. Although hardly
any research directly on the effectiveness of supply chain disclosure regimes has been
conducted to date, supply chain practices are not the only subject that governments
are compelling companies to disclose information on. Instead, supply chain laws are
part of a growing body of disclosure regulations that have become ubiquitous in a
variety of areas.13 But as this body of disclosure regulations has grown, so has an
extensive literature empirically studying their effectiveness. This literature has
largely challenged the value of mandated disclosures and has particularly questioned
whether consumers in fact read and understand them.14
Moreover, the problems that have limited the effectiveness of disclosure
regimes are likely to be exacerbated in the context of supply chain disclosures. We
argue that disclosures are not only unlikely to be read and understood generally, but
there are also several specific features of human rights-related supply chain
disclosure regimes that make them even less likely to be useful to consumers. Most
notably, while most disclosures concern the quality of a firm’s product or service,
supply chain disclosures provide information on the process by which a product was
manufactured (in the case of the CTSCA, whether human trafficking and slavery may
have been used in the production process). Moreover, human rights-related supply
chain disclosures are likely to be uniquely difficult to interpret because they do not
provide information on the actual number of human rights abuses a company has
committed. They instead only provide information on the level of due diligence
companies conduct to minimize the risk of human rights violations in their supply
chains. Finally, it is difficult for consumers and experts alike to assess the probability
of human rights abuse in a given company’s supply chain because the levels of risk
vary considerably based on a company’s size, industry, the country in which it
operates, the number of tiers of suppliers in its supply chain, and the total number of

12

Id. at 5.
See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE, 1–13 (2014). For specific examples, see, e.g., JAMES
T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE
TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM (2005); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information:
Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1707 (1999).
14
Some critics still see mandated disclosure as a promising tool if designed properly. See ARCHON
FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF
TRANSPARENCY 1–15 (2007); Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves,
3 ERASMUS L. REV. 93, 98 (2010); Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website
Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 849–52 (2006); see also Daniel
Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer
Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394 (2014) (emphasizing that mandatory disclosures would promote
market discipline or facilitate efforts of markets intermediaries). Yet others are more skeptical that this
regulatory technique can be fixed. See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and
Restaurant Grading, 122 YALE L.J. 574 (2012) (empirically analyzing effect of restaurant sanitation
grading disclosures); BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 34–35; Etzioni, supra note 6
(analyzing effect of mandatory disclosure on corporations).
13
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suppliers. Taken together, these features of supply chain disclosures make them
likely to be even less effective than disclosures in other contexts.
In order to test our argument, we engaged a leading market research firm to
recruit a nationally representative sample of respondents to complete a series of
experimental tests designed to measure whether consumers are able to understand the
contents of supply chain disclosures. In the primary experiment, we asked
respondents to read a company’s disclosure and then rate the company’s likely
commitment to eradicating slavery and human trafficking from its supply chain. For
the experimental treatment, we also randomly varied whether the disclosure reported
a high level of supply chain due diligence (indicating that the company is undertaking
a comprehensive effort to eradicate human rights violations from its supply chain)
versus a low level (indicating little effort by the company to manage human rights
risks within its supply chain). We further randomly varied whether the disclosure
only provided the basic information that the law requires, or whether the disclosure
went beyond compliance by conforming to the model disclosure guidelines that have
been released by the state of California. In both our primary experiment and our
additional tests, the respondents consistently rated disclosures that either were
completely non-compliant or reported low levels of due diligence almost as highly
as disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence. These results give credence
to our theory that it is unlikely that consumers will be able to differentiate between
these disclosures sufficiently to pressure companies to reduce the risk of human rights
abuses in their supply chains.
It is important to note that our argument and experimental results only
suggest that supply chain disclosures are unlikely to be understood and used by
consumers making purchasing decisions. It is admittedly still possible that, even if
the disclosures may not have the effect of changing consumers’ impressions of
companies, being forced to produce disclosures will compel companies to reconsider
their supply chain practices even without any external pressure. Additionally, the
disclosures may instead provide information that can be used by advocates in public
relations campaigns, lawsuits, or other forms of advocacy. In fact, consumer class
action lawsuits have recently been filed against Nestlé and Costco based on claims
of misleading and unfair business practices, which stem from the companies’ alleged
failure to ensure that their CTSCA public disclosures accurately represent their
human rights practices.15 Given the potential of leveraging information in CTSCA
disclosures to facilitate litigation, disclosures may have an effect unrelated to the way
that consumers respond to and comprehend them. If these are the primary ways that
supply chain disclosures are likely to have an effect, however, it would still call into
question the existing regimes because they have focused on designing short
disclosures directed at consumers and not the kind of comprehensive disclosures that
would be most useful for developing a lawsuit.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the ineffectiveness of
international law in regulating companies’ human rights practices as well as the rise
15
The class action cases against Nestlé and Costco alleged forced labor in their supply chains and
argued that the companies’ CTSCA statements on their websites were misleading as to their labor
practices. The Costco case was recently dismissed for lack of standing, while the Nestlé case was
dismissed in accordance with California’s “safe harbor” doctrine, which limited Nestlé’s liability.
However, the Nestlé case has been appealed to the 9th Circuit. See Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No.
15-3783, 2016 WL 192569 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2016); Barber v. Nestlé USA, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 954
(C.D. Cal. 2015).
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of efforts to do so through mandated disclosure. We then describe the CTSCA and
our findings of corporate compliance with and consumer awareness of this law. In
Part II, we discuss the need to critically examine supply chain regulations in light of
existing literature challenging the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure regimes in
general. We then highlight the unique characteristics of human rights-related supply
chain disclosures that suggest that they are even less likely to be effective than
disclosure regimes in other contexts. In Part III, we present the results of our primary
experiment designed to assess how supply chain disclosures influenced consumer
confidence in corporate efforts to root out human trafficking and slavery. We then
present the results of three additional tests of how respondents reacted to supply chain
disclosures. These tests measured: (1) the influence of disclosures on consumer
comprehension; (2) consumer views on actual disclosures; and (3) the reported
influence of disclosures on potential purchasing decisions. Finally, in Part IV, we
discuss the implications of our results and argue that current supply chain disclosure
laws should be reconsidered.
I. TOWARDS SUPPLY CHAIN DISCLOSURE
The tragic cases of corporate complicity in human rights violations abroad
have given rise to calls for supply chain accountability. Advocates have pursued
international law as a mechanism to regulate multinational corporations, thus giving
rise to a host of international standards culminating in the recently approved U.N.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.16 Yet these voluntary standards
have been ineffective in holding companies accountable for human rights abuses
committed by their suppliers. Therefore, some advocates are now turning to domestic
law—specifically mandated disclosure—as an alternative to international legal
mechanisms. Recent legislation in the United States and United Kingdom requires
companies to make disclosures on human rights due diligence conducted on their
supply chains.17 The first and most prominent supply chain disclosure law aimed at
consumers is the 2010 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA),
which is the subject of our study.
A. The Ineffectiveness of International Law
Scholars and policymakers have identified a governance gap with respect to
the prevention of extraterritorial human rights abuses by multinational corporations.18
In the words of John Ruggie, U.N. Special Representative for Business and Human
Rights:
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in
the governance gaps created by globalization—between the scope and
impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to
See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4.
See U.K. Modern Slavery Act; Business Supply Chain Transparency Act.
18
See, e.g., PENELOPE SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE (2014); Kishanthi Parella,
Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 749–50 (2014).
16
17
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manage their adverse consequences. These governance gaps provide the
permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without
adequate sanctioning or reparation.19
There is a governance gap in the reach of both national and international law,
thus leaving companies not legally accountable for potential human rights violations.
Closing this gap is therefore a critical challenge.
The governance gap is particularly pronounced in conflict-affected areas,
where host states lack the political capacity, rule of law, and/or will to enforce human
rights norms and provide redress to victims of human rights violations.20 Host states
are primarily concerned with attracting foreign investment, which may mean turning
a blind eye to domestic law violations or abstaining from passing human rights
regulations that could lead companies to shift their business elsewhere (with fewer
regulatory burdens).21 States in so-called “weak governance zones” are usually
plagued by corruption and may be unable to prevent or stop human rights violations
within their borders (and may sometimes be implicated in those violations
themselves).22
International law is a potential mechanism for closing the governance gap
and regulating corporate human rights abuses abroad. Scholars have argued that
companies have legal obligations under international law, particularly for violations
of human rights, labor rights, and environmental protection.23 A range of
intergovernmental mechanisms have emerged over the past several decades to
address the human rights conduct of transnational corporations. Existing standards
include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, ILO’s Tripartite
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy,
the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the U.N. Global Compact,
and ISO 26000.24 These standards have been influential in developing new norms
19
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises: Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
20
See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4, at § I.B.7.
21
See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111
YALE L.J. 443, 460, 463 (2001).
22
See OECD, RISK AWARENESS TOOL FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN WEAK
GOVERNANCE ZONES 9, 27 (2006).
23
See, e.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 195–
270 (2006); José E. Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 1, 31 (2011); Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human
Rights Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 341 (2001); David Kinley & Junko Tadaki,
From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International
Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 933 (2004); Ratner, supra note 21, at 475–88.
24
See OECD, The OECD Guidelines For Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and
Clarifications,
DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)15/FINAL
(Oct.
31,
2001),
https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?
doclanguage=en&cote=daffe/ime/wpg(2000)15/final; International Labor Organization, Tripartite
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (4th ed. 2006),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_emp/—-emp_ent/—multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf; Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
(2000), http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles/; United Nations, UN
Global Compact (2000), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html;
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and setting expectations for companies, many of which have responded by adopting
internal codes of conduct and compliance systems on human rights.25
The most recent and highly publicized international mechanism is the U.N.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding Principles), which were
unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2011.26 The Guiding
Principles, which are the result of extensive, multi-year consultations, have become
the dominant framework for articulating the international law landscape with respect
to business and human rights. The Guiding Principles rest on three pillars: (1) the
state duty to protect human rights; (2) the corporate responsibility to respect human
rights; and (3) the need for access to remedies for victims of human rights abuses.27
While the Guiding Principles assign states the primary duty to protect against
corporate human rights abuses, they also urge companies to undertake a regular
process of human rights due diligence whereby human rights abuses are treated as
critical business risks.
The Guiding Principles define the parameters of corporate due diligence,
which is aimed at identifying, preventing, mitigating, and accounting for potential
adverse human rights impacts.28 According to the Guiding Principles, the process of
conducting due diligence should be ongoing throughout the life of an activity, include
all internationally recognized human rights as a reference point, and extend to a
company’s suppliers.29 Companies are expected to “seek to prevent or mitigate
adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or
services by their business relationships, even if they have not contributed to those
impacts.”30 Business relationships are understood to include relationships with
“entities in [a company’s] value chain.”31 The Guiding Principles further call on
states to encourage, or where appropriate require, reporting by companies of their
due diligence measures to prevent adverse human rights impacts.32
Building on the recent approval of the Guiding Principles, the process is
underway to develop a U.N. treaty on business and human rights.33 According to its
proponents, a treaty could provide victims with access to justice remedies that are not
Int’l Org. for Standardization, ISO 26000: Guidance on Social Responsibility (2010),
http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42546. For further discussion of these international
legal
mechanisms,
see
SIMONS
&
MACKLIN, supra note 18, at 79–177.
25
See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 400 (2004–2005); Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 23, at 949–60.
26
See The U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, supra note 4; U.N. Guiding
Principles, supra note 4, at 3.
27
See U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4.
28
Id. at Principles 17–21.
29
Id. at Principles 17, 18 cmt.
30
Id. at Principle 13(b).
31
Id. at Principle 13(b) cmt.
32
Id. at Principle 3 cmt. The commentary states: “A requirement to communicate can be
particularly appropriate where the nature of business operations or operating contexts pose a significant
risk to human rights. Policies or laws in this area can usefully clarify what and how businesses should
communicate, helping to ensure both the accessibility and accuracy of communications.” Id.
33
For a discussion of options for a new international legal instrument on business and human
rights, see Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Needs and Options for a New International Instrument in the Field
of
Business
and
Human
Rights
(June
2014),
http://icj.wpengine.netdnacdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/NeedsandOptionsinternationalinstICJReportFinalelecvers.compre
ssed.pdf.
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outlined in the Guiding Principles and create binding obligations on corporations.34
There has been broad support in the NGO community for such a treaty, with more
than six hundred civil society organizations having signed a joint statement in 2013
calling for a binding international legal framework to protect against corporate
human rights abuses.35 In July 2014, the U.N. Human Rights Council passed a
resolution to create an open-ended intergovernmental working group to propose an
international treaty.36 A new expert legal group has been conducting consultations to
inform the treaty process over a two-year period, beginning in July 2015.37 The next
step will be to articulate options for the treaty, including whether it would only focus
on gross human rights violations, and whether it would apply to only transnational
corporations or also apply to state-owned firms, national companies, joint ventures,
and subsidiaries.38
Despite the development of multiple intergovernmental standards on
business and human rights as well as the movement for a binding treaty, international
law is currently an ineffective mechanism for regulating corporate human rights
abuses abroad. Existing standards have the status of voluntary soft law and lack
independent monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.39 This includes the Guiding
Principles, which have been criticized by many civil society organizations as
deficient in many respects.40 For instance, the Guiding Principles do not call on home
states to enact extraterritorial legislation. The Commentary to the Guiding Principles
states:

34
See Surya Deva, Corporate Human Rights Abuses and International Law: Brief Comments,
JAMESGSTEWART.COM: BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015), http://jamesgstewart.com/author/surya-deva/.
35
Treaty Alliance, Joint Statement: Call for an International Legally Binding Instrument on
Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (2013),
http://www.treatymovement.com/statement-2013.
36
See Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/26/9 (July 14, 2014).
37
The two-year treaty initiative is led by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
and The Corporate Accountability Working Group of the International Network for Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ESCR-Net). See ESCR-Net, New Expert Legal Group to Consult Around the world,
Then Develop Content Proposals for a Treaty on Human Rights and Corporate Activities: Project Launch
2015–2016 (2015), https://www.escr-net.org/node/365893.
38
See John G. Ruggie, Life in the Global Public Domain: Response to Commentaries on the U.N.
Guiding Principles and the Proposed Treaty on Business and Human Rights 4–6 (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2554726.
39
See John Gerard Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101
AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 834 (2007); SIMONS & MACKLIN, supra note 18, at 79–177; Kinley & Tadaki, supra
note 23, at 958–60.
40
See Joint Civil Society, Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, (Jan. 2011), FIDH http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Joint_CSO_Statement_on_GPs.pdf. For further
background and critiques of the Guiding Principles, see generally Larry Catá Backer, Moving Forward
the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State
Domestic Legal Orders, and the Treaty Law That Might Bind Them All, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457
(2015); Robert C. Blitt, Beyond Ruggie’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Charting
an Embracive Approach to Corporate Human Rights Compliance, 48 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 33 (2012); Anita
Ramasastry, Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap
Between Responsibility and Accountability, 14 J. HUMAN RIGHTS 237 (2015); Florian Wettstein, CSR
and the Debate on Business and Human Rights, 22 BUS. ETHICS Q. 739 (2012); David Weissbrodt,
Human Rights Standards Concerning Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities, 23 MINN.
J. INT’L L. 135 (2014); Cindy S. Woods, It Isn’t a State Problem: The Minas Conga Mine Controversy
and the Need for Binding International Obligations on Corporate Actors, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 629 (2015).
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At present States are not generally required under international human rights
law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their
territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally prohibited from doing
so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.41
Even though the Guiding Principles recognize the “significant legal gap[s]”
in home state practice with respect to regulating corporate human rights abuses, they
only place a minimal burden on host states. Moreover, despite calls to articulate legal
duties for corporations under international law, the Guiding Principles stop short of
taking this step. As the introduction to the Guiding Principles affirms, “nothing in
these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international law
obligations.”42
While the treaty process has gained momentum, it has also been subject to
substantial criticism.43 The aforementioned 2014 U.N. resolution, sponsored by
Ecuador and South Africa, only garnered a plurality, not a majority, of votes in the
Council. The opposing countries included the United States, all states in the
European Union, Japan, and Korea; there were also 13 abstentions. State opposition
to the resolution reflects the lack of broad political support for this endeavor.44 It thus
remains unclear whether the treaty process will result in an instrument that will garner
approval by the U.N. Human Rights Council, and how long such a process may take.
As a result, there is a risk that states will use this delay as an excuse for not
implementing the Guiding Principles.45 In addition, negotiations to achieve
consensus on a treaty may result in an instrument that is too vague to provide effective
guidance.46 In the absence of a U.N. treaty, the international law landscape consists
only of voluntary soft law standards, thus creating pressure for home states to address
corporate human rights abuses abroad.
B. The Rise of Domestic Disclosure Laws
Given the limitations of existing international legal mechanisms, domestic
law is emerging as a potential tool for regulating the extraterritorial human rights
abuses of multinational corporations. Home states are beginning to exert pressure on
corporations to abide by international human rights norms abroad, particularly in
light of the inability of host states to effectively govern companies that conduct
business within their borders. Since the U.S. Supreme Court recently limited the
exterritorial application of the Alien Tort Claims Act,47 advocates are pursuing
U.N. Guiding Principles, supra note 4, at 3–4.
Id. at 1.
43
See Backer, supra note 40, at 530.
44
See Erika R. George, Incorporating Rights: Making the Most of the Meantime 2 (2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2560082.
45
See John Tasioulas, Human Rights, No Dogmas: The UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights 3 (Jan. 30, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561420.
46
Id.
47
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013) (finding that the Alien Tort
Claims Act presumptively does not apply extraterritorially). The Alien Tort Claims Act allows U.S.
district courts to hear “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).
41
42
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mandatory information disclosure laws as an alternative mechanism to promote
corporate accountability.
Supply chain disclosure laws require companies to report on their efforts to
address human rights violations in their supply chains. This “new governance”
regulatory technique is less intrusive than one that imposes direct standards, and
therefore faces less political resistance.48 For example, a supply chain disclosure law
may require companies to provide information on whether they use third party
auditors to verify the labor practices of their suppliers. While failure to report under
these regulations may carry penalties, information disclosure laws largely operate
through non-coercive enforcement by facilitating pressure on companies by
consumers, NGOs, and investors.49
One example of an issue that supply chain disclosure laws have addressed is
the use of conflict minerals. The first legislation in this area was section 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Act, which imposes a new reporting requirement on publicly traded
companies that manufacture or contract to manufacture products using certain
conflict minerals.50 The stated rationale behind the law is that it will indirectly hinder
financing of the ongoing conflicts in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) by curbing the state and non-state armed groups’ illegitimate exploitation of
natural resources.
Under section 1502, companies must disclose whether they source minerals
originated in the DRC and bordering countries on a new form to be filed with the
SEC (Form SD for specialized disclosures).51 If a company does source minerals
from the DRC and bordering countries, it must also submit a Conflict Minerals
Report on due diligence measures taken to determine whether those conflict minerals
directly or indirectly financed or benefited armed groups in certain countries.52 The
quality of the due diligence must meet nationally or internationally recognized
standards, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas.53
One important feature of section 1502 is that because it requires an SEC
filing, it imposes penalties on companies for not reporting or complying in good
faith.54 Form SD is deemed filed under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
subject to section 18 of the Exchange Act, which attaches liability for any false or
misleading statements.55 Section 1502 also has a public disclosure requirement on

48

See supra text accompanying note 5.
Id.
50
See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502. While section 1502 was passed in 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the SEC issued a final rule in 2012 following a long public comment period.
51
For an analysis of the first set of Conflict Minerals Reports filed with the SEC as well as further
discussion of section 1502, see Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 419 (2015).
52
Id.
53
See OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from ConflictAffected and High-Risk Areas (2d ed. 2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264185050-en; see also
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 56281–82 (Sept. 12, 2012).
54
See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56280.
55
Id.
49
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company websites, which facilitates third-party rankings and the leveraging of
consumer, NGO, and investor pressure on companies to become conflict-free.56
It is important to note that the United States is not the only country that has
begun to use supply chain disclosure laws to limit the use of conflict minerals. In
February 2012, the DRC passed a law requiring all mining and mineral trading
companies operating in the country to undertake due diligence on all levels of their
supply chain according to the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains.57 Similarly in Canada, a conflict minerals act that would require
Canadian companies to exercise due diligence in sourcing minerals from the Great
Lakes Region of Africa in accordance with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance was
introduced in the House of Commons in 2013.58
Additionally, in late May 2015, the European Parliament endorsed a
mandatory regulation on the responsible sourcing of minerals from conflict-affected
and high-risk areas.59 The proposed law, which is estimated to affect over 800,000
European companies, would require companies to disclose the steps they have taken
to address risks in their supply chains for conflict minerals. As compared to section
1502, the European regulation would have a broader geographic scope, as it would
apply to conflict minerals sourced in all conflict-affected or high-risk areas (not just
in the DRC region). In addition, the European law would apply not only to
manufacturers but also to downstream companies (those that purchase from the
smelter or refiner). Finally, the regulation includes a mandatory certification
program involving independent third-party audits for smelters and refiners and
establishes a “European responsible importer” label for importers that comply with
the regulation.60 The labeling component highlights the law’s focus on consumers:
“[conflict] minerals, potentially present in consumer products, link consumers to
conflicts outside the [European] Union. As such, consumers are indirectly linked to
56
There are already various consumer applications that track sustainability issues such as conflict
minerals policies. See, e.g., RANKABRAND, www.rankabrand.org (last visited Mar. 8, 2015);
GOODGUIDE, www.goodguide.com (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). In addition, the Enough Project has
published a ranking of electronics companies in 2010 and 2012 based on a survey of their conflict
minerals policies and performance. See Enough Project, 2012 Conflict Minerals Company Rankings,
RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO (2012), http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/conflict-minerals-companyrankings.
57
See Arrêté ministériel N.0057.CAB.MIN/MINES/01/2012: Portant mise en œuvre du
Mécanisme Régional de Certification de la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands-Lacs «
CIRGL » en République Démocratique du Congo, MINISTERE DES MINES DE LA REPUBLIQUE
DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO, Article 8, http://mines-rdc.cd/fr/documents/Arrete_0057_2012.pdf; see
also Press Release, Glob. Witness, Congo Government Enforces Law to Curb Conflict Mineral Trade
(May
21,
2012),
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/Congo_government_enforces_law_to_curb_con
flict_minerals_trade.pdf.
58
Conflict
Minerals
Act,
H.C.
C-486,
41st
Parl.
(2013)
(Can.),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6062040&File=4.
The Canadian
Parliament ultimately voted down the bill.
59
The European Parliament had voted to reject the European Commission’s proposal for a
voluntary system of self-certification and instead requested for mandatory certification. See Press
Release, European Parliament, Conflict Minerals: MEPs Ask for Mandatory Certification of EU
Importers
(May
20,
2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/content/20150513IPR55318/html/Conflict-minerals-MEPs-ask-for-mandatory-certification-ofEU-importers.
60
See id.; see also European Parliament Votes for Tougher Measures on Conflict Minerals, THE
GUARDIAN (May 21, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/may/21/europeanparliament-tougher-measures-conflict-minerals.
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conflicts that have severe impacts on human rights.”61 The European Parliament will
next engage in negotiations with European member states on the text of the proposed
regulation, which will need final approval from the European Council to become law.
C. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act
Supply chain disclosure laws such as section 1502 of Dodd-Frank not only
require companies to make disclosures to investors on conflict minerals, but also
require companies to make disclosures directly to consumers on human rights more
broadly. The first, and most ambitious, of these laws is the 2010 California
Transparency in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA).
1. Requirements
The CTSCA, which took effect January 1, 2012, is an anti-human trafficking
law that targets the corporate supply chain and imposes disclosure requirements on
multinational firms. Under the CTSCA, companies are required to post disclosures
if they meet three criteria. The company must be a “[1] retail seller and manufacturer
[2] doing business in this state [of California] and [3] having annual worldwide gross
receipts that exceed one hundred million dollars ($100,000,000).”62
The CTSCA requires companies that meet these three criteria to disclose
their efforts to ensure that their supply chains are free from slavery and human
trafficking.63 It outlines five topics that companies must report on their websites
regarding their supply chain due diligence: verification,64 audits,65 certification,66
internal accountability,67 and training.68

61
See Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council Setting up a Union System for Supply Chain Due Diligence
Self-Certification of Responsible Importers of Tin, Tantalum and Tungsten, their Ores, and Gold
Originating in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, Amendment 6, Proposal for a Regulation Recital
8 (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A82015-0141&language=EN#title2.
62
CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3.
63
Id.
64
Id.; Verification: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail seller or
manufacturer . . . [e]ngages in verification of product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of
human trafficking and slavery. The disclosure shall specify if the verification was not conducted by a
third party.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(1).
65
CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; Audits: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail
seller or manufacturer . . . [c]onducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with company
standards for trafficking and slavery in supply chains. The disclosure shall specify if the verification was
not an independent, unannounced audit.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(2).
66
CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; Certification: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the
retail seller or manufacturer . . . [r]equires direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the
product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country or countries in
which they are doing business.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(3).
67
CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; Accountability: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that
the retail seller or manufacturer . . . [m]aintains internal accountability standards and procedures for
employees or contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and trafficking.” CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(4).
68
CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; Training: “[A]t a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the retail
seller or manufacturer . . . [p]rovides company employees and management, who have direct
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As an information disclosure law, the CTSCA does not require companies
to implement any new measures or ensure that their supply chains are free from
human trafficking or slavery. Rather, it simply requires disclosure on a company’s
website of its efforts to eradicate human rights violations in its supply chain.
Corporate statements must be accessible through a “conspicuous and easily
understood link,” with the goal of helping consumers make informed purchasing
decisions.69 Third parties are already beginning to compile this information in order
to more effectively reach consumers.70 The only remedy for failure to comply with
the law is an action brought by the Attorney General of California for injunctive
relief.
2. Compliance
Since the Attorney General of California has not yet brought actions against
companies for failing to comply with the CTSCA,71 it is an open question whether
companies actually have compiled with the requirements of the law. In order to
analyze regulatory compliance with the CTSCA, we compiled a dataset of whether
companies that met the law’s criteria had posted supply chain disclosures as of the
summer of 2015.
To identify companies that meet these criteria, we relied on a database
compiled by KnowTheChain. This non-profit organization “was initially created to
encourage greater corporate understanding of the California Supply Chain
Transparency Act” and continues to serve as “a resource for businesses and investors
who need to understand and address forced labor abuses within their supply chains.”72
As part of that mission, KnowTheChain has attempted to develop a list of companies
that meet the criteria to make a disclosure under the CTSCA.73
There are 501 companies on KnowTheChain’s list of companies that are
required to make disclosures under the CTSCA.74 To build our dataset, we
responsibility for supply chain management, training on human trafficking and slavery, particularly with
respect to mitigating risks within the supply chains of products.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(5).
69
CTSCA, S.B. 657 § 3; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(b).
70
For instance, KnowTheChain has compiled a dataset that checks whether applicable companies
posted statements that addressed at least three of the five statutory requirements. See Five Years of the
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, KNOWTHECHAIN (Sep. 30, 2015),
https://knowthechain.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/KnowTheChain_InsightsBrief_093015.pdf.
71
Although no actions have thus far been brought by the Attorney General of California, in April
2015, the Office of the Attorney General sent informational letters to companies that are required to
comply with the legislation but had not yet posted disclosure statements on their websites. It also issued
a consumer alert on the legislation and created an online form to report suspected violations. See Press
Release, Office of the Attorney General of California, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Issues
Consumer Alert on California Transparency in Supply Chains Act (Apr. 13, 2015),
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/sb657/consumer-alert.pdf?.
72
See About Us, KNOWTHECHAIN, https://knowthechain.org/about-us/.
73
To develop its list of companies that are required to make a disclosure under the CTSCA,
KnowTheChain used a three-wave process. First, a research team used criteria developed by an outside
law firm to search the Hoovers D&B database for companies that met the CTSCA’s criteria. Second, a
different group of researchers used the Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ database to identify additional
companies that meet the CTSCA’s criteria. Third, KnowTheChain also included a “small number of
additional companies” that its research team discovered had already made disclosures in the list of
companies required to do so. See KNOWTHECHAIN, supra note 70, at 12–13.
74
KnowTheChain occasionally updates its database. This number is based on the number of
companies included on May 1, 2015. This list, however, may be both under- and over-inclusive. The
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independently collected data on each of these 501 companies. For each of these
companies, we first attempted to determine whether they have posted a CTSCA
disclosure. For each company that had a statement available, we then coded
information about the length, content, and visibility of its statement.
Figure 1 displays the percentage of companies that have a statement on their
website out of those identified by KnowTheChain as being required by the CTSCA
to file a disclosure. As Figure 1 shows, 79.2% (397 out of 501) have a CTSCA
disclosure posted, and 20.8% (104 out of 501) do not.
Figure 1: Companies With CTSCA Disclosures Posted
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Although roughly a fifth of companies have still not complied with the
CTSCA, it does appear that compliance has increased over time. KnowTheChain
reports that when it launched in October 2013, 71% of required companies had posted
a CTSCA disclosure.75 To increase compliance, in January 2014 KnowTheChain and
the Business and Human Rights Resource Center began to contact companies that
had not yet made disclosures.76 Of the 129 companies contacted, 44 companies
responded to their communications (and 85 did not).77 Although this response rate is
low, the targeted communication efforts may have contributed to the increase in
compliance between when KnowTheChain began checking for disclosures in 2013
and our efforts to check statements in the summer of 2015.

list is probably under-inclusive because many companies required to make disclosures are not easily
identifiable using public databases. Moreover, the list is possibly over-inclusive because there may be a
few companies that voluntarily made disclosures even though they did not meet all three criteria (although
we believe this to be a handful of companies at most).
75
See KnowTheChain: Mixed Corporate Response to California’s Transparency Law, HUMANITY
UNITED (Feb. 12, 2014), https://humanityunited.org/knowthechain-mixed-corporate-response-tocalifornias-transparency-law/; Announcing KnowTheChain.org (Oct. 21, 2013), HUMANITY UNITED,
http://archive.humanityunited.org/blog/announcing-knowthechainorg#.Vd0JSZ1Viko.
76
See KnowTheChain: Mixed Corporate Response to California’s Transparency Law, HUMANITY
UNITED, supra note 75.
77
Id.
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For each of the 397 disclosures that we were able to locate, we coded their
contents for compliance with the CTSCA. We specifically coded whether each of
the 397 disclosures reported on the five topics that companies are required to discuss
according to the CTSCA.78 Figure 2 presents data on the number of topics that were
covered in our dataset of disclosures.
Figure 2: Number of Topics Covered in CTSCA Disclosures
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As Figure 2 shows, there were ten companies that posted a CTSCA
disclosure, but did not adequately discuss a single one of the topics the law requires
for companies to disclose. Instead, these companies posted more general statements
on their efforts to avoid human trafficking and slavery.79 Additionally, there were a
number of companies that posted disclosures, but did not address all of the required
topics: ten companies addressed one topic; sixteen companies addressed two topics;
thirty-four companies addressed three topics; and sixty-eight companies addressed
four topics. In total, 34.8% of the companies that filed disclosures did not discuss all
five required topics.
Roughly two-thirds of companies that filed disclosures, however, addressed
all five of the required topics. More specifically, 259 companies—65.2% of those
that posted disclosures—addressed all five required topics. However, since the law
requires all five topics to be discussed, all companies that did not do so technically
are not in compliance with the CTSCA. This suggests that only a bare majority of
78
For a general overview of the requirements of the CTSCA, see CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 3–4.
79
For example, CarMax posted the following statement on its website: “CarMax recognizes the
serious nature of the crimes of human trafficking and slavery. CarMax has taken and will take every
reasonable effort to ensure that its supply chain is free of products that are tainted by human trafficking.
Because all of the vehicles sold by CarMax in California are used vehicles, and all of the replacement
parts CarMax uses in its reconditioning process are purchased from other retailers, CarMax believes that
it has taken all necessary steps to audit and reasonably mitigate the risk that its products are tainted by
the crimes of human trafficking and slavery.” See CarMax Terms & Conditions, Required California
Disclosure:
CA
Supply
Chain
Transparency,
http://www.carmax.com/enus/legalnotice/default.html#CA-supply-chain-transparency (last visited Jan. 2017).
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companies that KnowTheChain identified as being required to file a disclosure in
compliance with the CTSCA: just 52% of companies (259 out of 501) have posted a
disclosure that discusses all five of the topics required by the CTSCA.80
3. Awareness
One notable feature of the CTSCA is that it is designed to present
information directly to potential consumers. As a result, it is worth evaluating
potential consumer awareness and interest in CTSCA disclosures. In an effort to do
so, we administered a survey to a nationally representative sample of respondents in
order to explore consumer awareness of the CTSCA. In the survey, we asked
respondents two questions designed to measure their familiarity with the CTSCA: (1)
whether respondents were aware of the CTSCA81 and (2) whether they could
correctly identify the purpose of the CTSCA.82
Figure 3 reports the results of these questions. As the left panel reveals, a
reasonably large percentage of our respondents claimed to have heard of the CTSCA.
More specifically, 25% of respondents reported that they had heard of the CTSCA.
As the right panel reveals, however, only 10% of respondents correctly answered that
the purpose of the CTSCA is to provide information on efforts to prevent and root
out human trafficking and slavery.83 To put this in to perspective, if the respondents
were guessing between the seven answer choices randomly, they should have guessed
the correct answer 14% of the time.

80
It is worth noting that instead of requiring all five topics to be discussed, KnowTheChain has
elected to identify companies as compliant with the requirements of the CTSCA if they discuss 3 out of
5 of the required topics.
81
We specifically asked: “Have you heard of the ‘California Transparency in Supply Chains
Act?’”
82
We specifically asked: “Which of the following pieces of information do you think the
California Transparency in Supply Chains Act requires companies to disclose?” We then offered
respondents seven answers to choose from: (1) How the company is ensuring that all of its suppliers
comply with safety standards; (2) efforts the company is undertaking to prevent human trafficking in its
supply chain; (3) whether the company uses conflict minerals in its supply chain; (4) steps the company
is taking to reduce its carbon emissions; (5) none of the above; (6) all of the above; and (7) not sure. To
reduce the influence of ordering effects, the order of the first four options was randomized.
83
These answers are comparable for respondents from California: 27% of respondents reported
that they had heard of the CTSCA and 8% correctly identified its purpose.
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Figure 3: Reported Awareness of the CTSCA
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That said, these results likely overstate levels of awareness of the CTSCA
for three reasons. First, our survey was administered online, and respondents could
have taken the time to Google the CTSCA in another window. Second, many of the
respondents that correctly answered the question about the purpose of the CTSCA
had also reported having previously not heard of the CTSCA. In fact, only 6% of our
respondents reported having heard of the CTSCA and could correctly identify its
purpose (which is comparable to the 7% of respondents that would have been
expected to have selected that combination of responses if randomly answering).84
4. Other Examples
The CTSCA has served as a model for the transparency in supply chains
provision of the U.K.’s Modern Slavery Act (which was enacted in March 2015 and
took effect in October 2015), as well as the proposed U.S. Business Supply Chain
Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of 2015.85 The United Kingdom’s
disclosure requirement is broadly applicable to all companies that supply goods or
services to any part of the country and have turnover of at least £36 million.86 Thus,
it is not limited to U.K. entities or entities with their primary place of business in the
country. Companies subject to the U.K. Modern Slavery Act have to prepare a
slavery and human trafficking statement each financial year describing efforts they
have taken to ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not taking place in their
supply chains. As in the CTSCA, the Act does not impose any affirmative obligation
on companies to rid their supply chains of slavery and human trafficking; it only
84
To be exact, 89 out of 1,421 respondents reported having heard of the CTSCA and could
correctly identify its purpose. For respondents in California, 9 of 169 (5%) respondents reported having
heard of the CTSCA and could correctly identify its purpose.
85
See U.K. Modern Slavery Act; Business Supply Chain Transparency Act.
86
See U.K. Modern Slavery Act (Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015, SI
2015/1833, § 2 (UK).
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requires disclosure of any supply chain due diligence that were undertaken.87
Companies must post their statements on a prominent place on their websites, thus
highlighting the law’s intended goal of generating consumer pressure to motivate
corporate performance.88
While the United States has yet to pass a similar law, a proposed bill has
been introduced several times in Congress: in 2011, 2014, and most recently in July
2015. If passed, this bill would apply to all publicly traded and private companies
currently required to submit annual reports to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) (not just retailers and manufacturers doing business in
California), as long as those companies have annual worldwide gross receipts
exceeding $100 million.89 These companies would be required to disclose their
efforts to identify and address specific human rights risks in their supply chains:
forced labor, slavery, human trafficking, and the worst forms of child labor.90
Companies would have to disclose the required information on their websites
(“through a conspicuous and easily understandable link”).91 The proposed bill would
also require companies to file annual reports with the SEC, as is currently required
under the conflict minerals provision in the Dodd-Frank Act’s section 1502.92
II. THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE REGIMES
Disclosure laws operate under the assumption that transparency will lead to
accountability. In the case of supply chain disclosure regimes, the primary goal of
these laws is to pressure companies to conduct a high level of due diligence on their
suppliers, with the ultimate aim of preventing labor rights violations abroad. In an
ideal world, supply chain disclosures would lead to consumers making more
informed decisions that would drive companies to change their behavior.93 Yet is that
what happens in practice?
87
Additionally, as in the CTSCA, the U.K. Modern Slavery Bill does not contain penalties but
leaves open the possibility for the Secretary of State to bring civil proceedings in the High Court for an
injunction or, in Scotland, for specific performance of a statutory duty to ensure compliance. Id. The
U.K. government has released guidance on its transparency in supply chains provision in response to
consultations with a wide range of stakeholders. See U.K. HOME OFFICE, TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY
CHAINS
ETC.:
A
PRACTICE
GUIDE
(2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/471996/Transparency_in
_Supply_Chains_etc__A_practical_guide__final_.pdf; see also U.K. HOME OFFICE, MODERN SLAVERY
AND SUPPLY CHAINS GOVERNMENT RESPONSE: SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION RESPONSES AND NEXT
STEPS
(2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/448200/Consultation_G
overnment_Response__final__2_pdf.pdf.
88
According to the act, “if the organization does not have a website, it must provide a copy of the
slavery and human trafficking statement to anyone who makes a written request for one, and must do so
before the end of the period of 30 days beginning with the day on which the request is received.” U.K.
Modern Slavery Act § 54(8).
89
Business Supply Chain Transparency Act § 3(3)(A).
90
Id. § 3(1).
91
Id. § 3(2)(A).
92
See id. § 3(1); Dodd-Frank Act § 1502.
93
Richard Craswell distinguishes between “static” and “dynamic” purposes of disclosures. Static
disclosures aim “to improve a consumer’s choice from among the existing choice set,” while dynamic
disclosures “seek to improve the existing choice set by creating incentives for sellers to improve the
quality of their offerings.” See Richard Craswell, Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not To
Judge Their Success or Failure, 88 WASH. L. REV. 333, 334 (2013).
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Although there is little research on supply chain disclosures directed at
consumers,94 scholars have analyzed the value of mandated disclosure in a variety of
other regulatory areas. Existing literature has largely called into question the value
of this regulatory tool and suggested a limited set of conditions under which more
“targeted transparency” initiatives could work.95 Given the unique characteristics that
distinguish human rights-related supply chain disclosures, we argue that they are
even less likely to be effective than disclosure regimes in other contexts.
A. Scholarship on the Effectiveness of Disclosures
Mandated disclosure has become ubiquitous in a variety of regulatory areas,
including privacy policies, informed consent in health care, and consumer protection
in banking.96 Given the relative ease of enacting mandated disclosure as compared
to more direct and intrusive techniques, this tool has become “the principal regulatory
answer to some of the principal policy questions of recent decades.”97 Yet a growing
academic literature has questioned the effectiveness of disclosure regimes given their
reported failures to achieve their purported goals.98 The most acute criticisms are
aimed at the perspective of consumers.99 A significant body of literature has focused
on whether the public reads, understands, or trusts disclosures, and whether the public
uses disclosures to enhance their decision-making.
In fact, scholars have demonstrated that consumers frequently do not read
disclosures, or at best only skim them.100 For instance, one study found that only one
or two out of every thousand retail software shoppers actually read end user license
agreements (“the fine print”) online.101 In other words, almost all online shoppers
have not read the terms that they have agreed to. Aside from issues of illiteracy,
disclosures may be unreadable because of an “overload problem” from disclosures

94
But see Sarfaty, supra note 51 (empirically studying compliance with section 1502 of the DoddFrank Act).
95
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14.
96
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider discuss the reasons for the ubiquity of mandated
disclosure—it appeals to lawmakers because it looks cheap, easy, and effective despite empirical
evidence that may suggest otherwise. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 5–6.
97
BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 4.
98
Critics have also highlighted limitations of disclosure regimes from the perspective of the firms
that disclose. For instance, it is unclear whether disclosers can accurately ascertain what information
they need to reveal under regulations, can locate and assemble the requisite data, and can effectively
present that information to best reach consumers. See id. at 3–13.
99
See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647, 691–98 (2011).
100
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract Law,
5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1 (2009); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 94 (2012).
101
See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the
Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014). As a result
of the low readership among buyers, there is a concern that sellers will impose unfair and one-sided terms
in contracts. See Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 100; see also Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 630 (1979) (discussing when imperfect information justifies intervention in consumer
markets).
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being too complex and copious for consumers to handle.102 Another reason that the
public may not read disclosures is because of an “accumulation problem” from
consumers being confronted with so much information from so many disclosures that
it is difficult for them to remember, interpret, and apply that information.103 In other
words, more information is not always better.
Even if consumers do read disclosures, critics contend that the public
frequently does not understand them and incorporates little (if any) of the information
into decisions. Disclosures are generally written at a college level and often fail to
describe complex information in simple terms.104
Moreover, consumers’
psychological biases may shape how they perceive disclosures and ultimately how
those disclosures shape their activity.105 For instance, a study of credit card
disclosures revealed that consumers often have imperfect self-control and
underestimate the likelihood of future adverse events, which makes them unable to
factor in all of the relevant costs of credit card borrowing in disclosed terms.106
Because people often misperceive, misinterpret, and misuse disclosures, it is difficult
for policymakers to predict whether disclosures will be used appropriately. Finally,
the public may not trust the disclosers that release information. There is a fear among
some consumers that a company disclosing information “has managed to exploit
imperfections in the measuring system, thus making its own brand look better than it
really is.”107
Yet these limitations do not necessarily mean that mandated disclosure is a
completely ineffective regulatory technique or, worse, harmful given the costs it
imposes on firms that disclose. Scholars have emphasized that a key factor for
determining success is how disclosures are designed and executed, keeping in mind
the distinctive goals of each disclosure law.108 For the purpose of our study of the
CTSCA, success is defined as changing firms’ behavior by impacting their decision-

102

See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 8–9.
See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
CONSUMER MARKETS 36-37 (2012); Eugene G. Chewning, Jr. & Adrian M. Harrell, The Effect of
Information Load on Decision Makers’ Cue Utilization Levels and Decision Quality in a Financial
Distress Decision Task, 15 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 527, 539–40 (1990); Kevin Lane Keller & Richard
Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMER RES.
200, 211–12 (1987); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2003); BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at
8–9.
104
See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 8.
105
See OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
CONSUMER MARKETS (2012) (explaining how consumer contracts are a product of both market forces
and consumer psychology); Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
33, 33–45 (2006); Jill E. Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes?
An Experiment on Mutual Fund Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605 (2014) (finding that investors seek and
assimilate information in decision-making); Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes,
Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505 (2006)
(showing that information “shrouding” can be common in even highly competitive markets); Tess
Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745 (2014)
(exploring the psychological processes and biases that shape how consumers understand consent to fine
print).
106
See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004).
107
Craswell, supra note 93, at 368.
108
See Bar-Gill & Oliver Board, Product-Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure,
14 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 235 (2012); Craswell, supra note 93; FUNG, GRAHAM, & WEL, supra note 14;
Schwarcz, supra note 14.
103
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making calculus through, for instance, consumer, investor, or NGO pressure. The
effectiveness of a disclosure in achieving this success thus may depend on “the
length, format, and type of terms that are disclosed, as well as the setting in which it
is presented.”109
B. The Unique Difficulties of Human Rights Disclosures
While there is an extensive literature on the effectiveness of mandated
disclosure in other areas, little research has addressed the growing body of laws that
require companies to disclose information about their supply chain in the hopes of
improving human rights outcomes. It is our argument that, even if companies
complied with these regulations, there are at least three features of human rightsrelated supply chain disclosures that suggest that they are less likely to be effective
than disclosure regimes in other contexts: (1) the disclosures discuss production
processes and not product characteristics; (2) the information they provide is difficult
to interpret because they are only proxies for the probability of human rights abuses;
and (3) the regimes ignore the considerable heterogeneity among companies with
regard to the probability of risk, which complicates comparisons across disclosures.
First, although mandatory disclosures typically require companies to provide
information on features of their products or services, human rights-related disclosures
are unique in that they require companies to provide information on the process by
which a product was made. For instance, a law may mandate credit card companies
to disclose information about the quality of their products, such as the interest rates
they charge. In contrast, supply chain disclosure regimes do not require companies
to provide information about their products’ characteristics; they instead require
companies to disclose whether the processes used to manufacture their products are
likely to allow for human rights abuses.
In other words, if a consumer were deciding whether to buy a pair of jeans
manufactured by Company A or Company B, a human rights-related supply chain
disclosure would not tell the consumer anything about the durability of the fabric or
the quality of the stitching. Instead, the disclosure would inform the consumer, for
instance, as to whether Company A or B hired third party auditors to assess potential
human rights violations in the factory where the jeans had been sown. Since the
physical characteristics of the two pairs of jeans would remain the same even if one
product were made without using child labor while another product was
manufactured using child labor,110 the disclosure regime would only be effective if
consumers were willing to change their purchasing decisions on the basis of an
intangible benefit (e.g., supporting the human rights of employees who manufactured
that product).
Of course, supply chain disclosure regimes are not the only regulations that
require companies to provide information on their production methods. For example,
other disclosure regulations that cover non-product characteristics include
109
Joshua Mitts, How Much Mandatory Disclosure Is Effective? 9 (Oct. 4, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2404526.
110
In international trade, this characteristic is referred to as a “non-product-related process and
production method,” which does not render products as “unlike.” In addition to the issue of human rights
in a product’s supply chain, another characteristic that falls under this category is the environmental
footprint of a product.
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environmental disclosures relating to the sustainability of the production process (but
that do not affect their safety) and those that describe animal well-being in the
production process. Since existing literature on the limits of mandated disclosure has
largely focused on disclosures that do affect the quality of a firm’s product or service,
human rights disclosures represent largely unchartered territory where we believe the
effects are going to be even more attenuated.
Second, human rights-related supply chain disclosures are likely to be less
effective than other disclosures because they are uniquely difficult to interpret.
Supply chain disclosures do not provide information on the actual number of human
rights abuses a company has committed. Instead, they provide information on the
level of due diligence conducted by companies to minimize the risk of human rights
violations in their supply chains. These disclosure regimes thus operate under the
assumption that due diligence efforts are reliable proxies for human rights outcomes.
The disclosures are difficult for consumers to interpret, however, because it
is unclear to what extent these proxies actually reveal the probability that a
company’s suppliers will actually conduct human rights abuses. In fact, it is unclear
whether even experts can make reliable conclusions about the risk of human rights
violations in corporate supply chains based on their disclosures. In the case of
disclosures under the CTSCA, do consumers have the expertise to extract an overall
risk profile for a company based on information on verification, audits, certification,
internal accountability, and training? Is a company that uses third party auditors but
does not have human rights training more or less likely to use suppliers that commit
human rights abuses than a company that uses internal audits but does provide human
rights training? Therefore, even if companies post supply chain disclosures and
consumers take the time to read them, it is not clear that consumers will know how
to interpret the information.
Third, when assessing the probability of human rights abuses in a given
company’s supply chain, one must recognize that the levels of risk vary considerably
based on a company’s size, industry, the country in which it operates, the number of
tiers of suppliers in its supply chain, and the total number of suppliers. Existing
scholarship has empirically demonstrated that repeated audits are not the key
predictor of workplace compliance with labor standards; rather, other factors such as
the local institutional context (in particular, the strength of state regulatory
institutions and the strength of local civil society) are more directly linked to effective
compliance.111 Consumers are typically unaware of the multiple variables that impact
a company’s risk profile, particularly given that supply chain laws such as the
CTSCA impose the same requirements for companies that operate in different
industries and geographic areas. Therefore, it is difficult for consumers to rely solely

111
See Greg Distelhorst et al., Production Goes Global, Compliance Stays Local: Private
Regulation in the Global Electronics Industry, 9 REG. & GOV. 224 (2015); see also RICHARD M. LOCKE,
THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2013); GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM (2007); Daniel Berliner et al., Governing Global Supply Chains: What We
Know (and Don’t) About Improving Labor Rights and Working Conditions, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
193 (2015); Richard M. Locke & Monica Romis, The Promise and Perils of Private Voluntary
Regulation: Labor Standards and Work Organization in Two Mexican Garment Factories, 17 REV. INT’L
POL. ECON. 45 (2010); Richard M. Locke, Fei Qin & Alberto Brause, Does Monitoring Improve Labor
Standards? Lessons from Nike, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (2007).
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on these disclosures to draw conclusions about the underlying human rights risks
within a company’s supply chain.
C. Assessing the Effectiveness of Supply Chain Disclosures
Taken together, we believe that the three issues raised in the last section are
likely to limit the effectiveness of laws that seek to reduce human rights violations
by requiring companies to post information about their supply chain due diligence
efforts. However, we are unaware of any efforts to date to empirically test the
effectiveness of these regimes. Although academics and NGOs have evaluated
whether companies have complied with disclosure requirements, these studies have
not tested the effect that these disclosures have on either consumer or corporate
behavior.112
Obviously, policy makers, scholars, and advocates are eager to know
whether these laws will ultimately lead to fewer violations of human rights.
Unfortunately, though, directly testing the effectiveness of these laws in producing
positive human rights outcomes is complicated—if not impossible—for a number of
reasons. First, a great deal of the data that would be required for this analysis is not
publicly available. For example, data on the web traffic to companies’ disclosures
are not publically available, and, most importantly, the kind of micro-level data of
human rights abuses that would be required to conduct such a study is currently not
available. Second, since companies are not forced to post supply chain disclosures
(even though they are legally required to do so), it is likely the case that the decision
to post the disclosures is endogenous to human rights practices. In other words, if
only those companies that prioritize eradicating human rights abuses post disclosures,
even research that found companies that post supply chain disclosures to be less likely
to use suppliers that engage in human rights abuses would not demonstrate that it was
due to the disclosure.
Despite these obstacles, it is worth trying to find alternative ways to
empirically assess the effectiveness of these regimes. Given the difficulty of using
observational research methods, one can use experimental methods to empirically
assess whether the policy in question can lead to reductions in human rights abuses.113
For corporate supply chain disclosures, the primary justification for requiring
companies to post disclosures is to provide consumers with information that can
shape their purchasing decisions, and in doing so, pressure companies to change their
behavior.114 It is thus possible to gain some traction on the question of whether these
laws are effective by studying whether consumers understand and change their
opinions based on the information provided in supply chain disclosures.

112
See, e.g., Chris N. Bayer, Corporate Compliance with the Transparency in Supply Chains Act
of 2010 (Nov. 2, 2015), http://media.wix.com/ugd/f0f801_0276d7c94ebe453f8648b91dd35898ba.pdf;
Five Years of the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, KNOWTHECHAIN (Sept. 30, 2015),
https://www.knowthechain.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/KnowTheChain_InsightsBrief_093015.pdf.
113
For a defense of using experimental methods to test the effectiveness of laws aimed at improving
human rights, see Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, Why The Study of International Law Needs
Experiments, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 172 (2013).
114
See supra note 11.
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In an effort to assess the potential effectiveness of supply chain disclosure
regimes, we designed a series of experimental tests to evaluate how consumers
understand and interpret supply chain disclosures. We designed our experiments to
specifically test the effectiveness of the recently passed California Transparency in
Supply Chains Act (CTSCA). We chose to do so because it is the first supply chain
disclosure law around human rights that was directed at consumers. Given that
California represents the world’s seventh largest economy and the country’s largest
consumer base, this law has the potential to have a significant impact.115 Moreover,
scholars have found a “California effect” whereby other state regulations and
eventually federal law have ratcheted up standards to match stricter California laws.116
Since disclosures are posted to company websites, consumers across the country (and
the world) now have access to information on corporate human rights practices and
can make purchasing decisions that do not “inadvertently promote the crime of
trafficking.”117
III. EXPERIMENTAL ASSESSMENTS
To better understand how individuals process and understand supply chain
disclosures, we embedded several experiments in a survey administered to a
nationally representative sample of respondents.118 In this Part, we first discuss the
motivation behind our experimental assessment of supply chain disclosure regimes.
Second, we discuss the sample that we recruited for our study. Third, we present the
results of our primary experiment designed to assess how supply chain disclosures
influenced consumer confidence in corporate efforts to root out human trafficking
and slavery. Finally, we present the results of three additional tests of how
respondents reacted to supply chain disclosures: (1) the influence of disclosures on
comprehension; (2) consumer views on actual disclosures; and (3) the reported
influence of disclosures on potential purchasing decisions.
A. Motivation
We designed our experiments to test several aspects of how consumers
understand and respond to the kind of supply chain disclosures that are required by
the CTSCA. First, we designed our experiments to test whether information on the
topics required to be disclosed improves consumer confidence in corporate efforts to
root out human trafficking and slavery. As previously noted, the CTSCA requires
companies to discuss five specific topics in their disclosures.119 It is not obvious,
however, that consumers equipped with information on these five topics have greater
115
See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at i. California’s Franchise Tax
Board estimates that approximately 1,700 companies are likely subject to the law. Id. at 3.
116
For a discussion of the “California effect” as applied to the history of American automobile
emission standards, see DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 248–70 (1995). See also Brian Greenhill, Layna Mosley & Aseem Prakash,
Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986–2002, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 669 (2009)
(investigating the nature of the linkages between trade and labor rights in developing countries).
117
CAL. ATT’Y GEN., THE STATE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN CALIFORNIA: 2012 (2012), at 90.
118
Appendix A provides a figure illustrating the flow of our survey.
119
See supra text accompanying notes 64–68.
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confidence in corporate efforts to root out human rights violations as compared to
consumers that are provided general statements on a company’s commitment to
human rights.
Second, we designed our experiments to test whether consumers have
greater confidence in disclosures that report a high level of due diligence among
companies (indicating a comprehensive effort to eradicate human rights violations
from its supply chain), as compared to disclosures that report a low level of supply
chain due diligence. Although the CTSCA requires companies to reveal their
practices on five specific topics, it does not require companies to actually adopt
specific policies on those topics. For example, the CTSCA requires companies to
discuss whether a third party verifies their supply chains, but it does not require
companies to have a third party verify their supply chains. Thus, the CTSCA aims
to shape corporate behavior by providing information to consumers so that they can
reward companies that take efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from
their supply chain and punish companies that fail to do so. In light of this goal, it is
important to test whether consumers can in fact tell the difference between
disclosures that make optimal versus minimal efforts to mitigate human rights risks
within their supply chains.
Third, we designed our experiments to test the effectiveness of “best
practice” disclosures. Although the CTSCA requires companies to make disclosures
on five topics, the amount of information that companies are required to provide on
each of these topics is fairly minimal. That said, the California Attorney General’s
office encourages companies to make “best practice” disclosures that provide more
comprehensive information on each topic.120 In order to facilitate this goal, the
California Attorney General’s office has released guidelines outlining the additional
information that it recommends companies provide.121 Our experiment was designed
to test whether following these guidelines (1) improves consumer confidence and (2)
makes it easier for consumers to distinguish between companies that report
comprehensive efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking and those that
report only minimal efforts.
Fourth, we designed our experiments to test how well consumers
comprehend the relevant information contained within supply chain disclosures. The
CTSCA attempts to motivate companies to release disclosures that will be easy for
consumers to understand. It is not clear, however, that the format that the CTSCA
requires of companies improves consumers’ ability to understand the content of the
disclosures. It is instead possible that the required format of the disclosures obscures
the relevant information, and in doing so, makes it difficult for consumers to evaluate
the due diligence practices and policies of a given company.
Finally, we designed our experiments to test the reported effect that the
supply chain disclosures would have on potential future purchasing decisions. Of
course, what we would ideally like to know is whether consumers are more (or less)
likely to buy products from companies with supply chain disclosures that report better
(or worse) due diligence practices. Since we are unable to directly observe future

120
121

See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8.
Id.
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purchasing decisions, however, we can only evaluate the effect that the quality of
disclosures has on claimed willingness to pay for products or services.122
B. Subject Recruitment
Our sample was recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI).123 SSI is
a leading market research firm that primarily conducts research for corporate clients,
but that also works with academic researchers. We specifically engaged SSI to
recruit a nationally representative sample of respondents to complete a survey that
we designed. The sample SSI recruited was nationally representative of the U.S.
adult population based on gender, age, race/ethnicity, and census region. Our survey
was administered online to 1,421 respondents during the week of February 15–19,
2016. Table 1 provides a demographic breakdown of our sample compared to the
U.S. adult population.
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Our Sample

Gender
Male
Female
Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+
Race/Ethnicity
White
Hispanic
Black
Asian
Other
Region
Northeast
Midwest
South
West

#
in Sample

%
of Sample

% of U.S.
Population

685
736

48%
52%

48%
52%

206
264
254
239
241
216

14%
19%
18%
17%
17%
15%

13%
18%
18%
19%
16%
17%

1,030
129
166
67
27

72%
13%
12%
5%
2%

69%
9%
11%
4%
2%

265
312
527
313

19%
22%
37%
22%

18%
22%
37%
23%

122
For examples of studies that also focus on willingness to pay, see, for example, Lior Jacob
Strahilievitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL
STUD. S69 (forthcoming 2016).
123
For
more
information,
see
SURVEY
SAMPLING
INTERNATIONAL,
https://www.surveysampling.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
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C. Primary Experiment
1. Research Design
For our primary experiment, we asked each of our respondents to read one
disclosure. We began by informing our respondents that “[t]he following questions
are about company disclosures. We will describe one disclosure posted on a
company’s website. We will then ask for your thoughts on the disclosure. Thank
you for taking the time to answer these carefully!” After being displayed this prompt,
on the following screen the respondents were randomly presented with one of five
different supply chain disclosures.124 Those five disclosures are summarized in Table
2.
Table 2: Summary of the Five Treatment Groups

# Name
1

2

3

4

4

Description
A general statement on the company’s
commitment to human rights that did not
General Statement
discuss the five topics required by the
CTSCA.
A basic disclosure that suggested that the
company was engaging in optimal efforts
Basic – Optimal
for each of the five topics required by the
CTSCA.
A basic disclosure that suggested that the
company was engaging in minimal efforts
Basic – Minimal
for each of the five topics required by the
CTSCA.
A best practice disclosure that suggested
that the company was engaging in optimal
Best Practice – Optimal
efforts for each of the five topics required
by the CTSCA.
A best practice disclosure that suggested
that the company was engaging in minimal
Best Practice – Minimal
efforts for each of the five topics required
by the CTSCA.

124

Appendix B provides the exact text of the five disclosures used in our experiment.
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The General Statement was taken from the CTSCA Resource Guide
produced by the California Attorney General’s office (the “resource guide”).125 The
resource guide specifically notes that “a general statement opposing human rights
violations, while well-intentioned, does not suffice because it does not address the
five areas outlined in the statute.”126 The general statement that we used was included
in the resource guide as an example of such an inadequate general statement. The
statement that we used as an experimental treatment reads:
Our company is committed to respecting the human rights of our employees.
Our Code of Ethics and company policies adhere to the principles of free
choice of employment, nondiscrimination, and humane treatment. We
ensure compliance with regulations governing child labor, minimum wage,
and maximum working hour limitations.127
The templates for the Basic and Best Practice disclosures used in our other
four treatments were also based on materials in the resource guide. For each of the
five topics required by the CTSCA, the resource guide offers examples of basic
disclosures that provide the minimum information required for compliance, and best
practice disclosures that provide more detailed information with “depth and context”
to better educate consumers on corporate activities.128 Our two basic disclosures and
our two best practice disclosures were drawn from examples for all five topics from
the resource guide. As an illustration, Table 3 provides the text of the basic and best
practice disclosures that we used for the “Certification” topic. According to the
resource guide, a best practice disclosure under the “Certification” topic “explain[s]
any additional efforts [companies] make to encourage their direct suppliers to comply
with labor and anti-trafficking laws.”129 Such additional efforts that should be
reported in best practice disclosures include “what records [a company] requires
suppliers to maintain to support their certification.”

125
126
127
128
129

See CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ii.
Id. at 17.
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Table 3: Example Disclosures on Supply Chain “Certification”

We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply
with anti-slavery and human trafficking laws in the
country or countries in which they do business.
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply
with anti-slavery and human trafficking laws in the
country or countries in which they do business. Our
partners must produce records to our company. Such
records include: (1) proof of age for every worker; (2)
Best Practice
every employee’s payroll records and timesheets; (3)
Disclosure
written documentation of terms and conditions of
employment; (4) local health and safety evaluations or
documentation of exemption from law; and (5) records of
employee grievances and suggestions, and any employer
responses.
Basic
Disclosure

In addition to randomly varying whether the disclosures we presented to
readers were basic or best practice, we also randomly varied whether the disclosures
reported the use of optimal efforts or minimal efforts to mitigate human rights risks
within supply chains. For example, for the “Certification” topic, companies must
disclose if they require suppliers “to certify that materials incorporated into the
product comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country
or countries in which they are doing business.”130 By implication, an optimal effort
is one that requires suppliers to certify that they comply with the anti-trafficking laws
of the countries in which they do business, while a minimal effort is one that does not
require suppliers to certify that they comply with these laws. For each of the five
topics, similar requirements exist. For our “optimal” disclosures, the companies
reported engaging in optimal efforts for each of the five topics. For our minimal
disclosures, the companies reported engaging in minimal efforts for each of the five
topics. Table 4 presents the policies reported in the optimal and minimal disclosures.
On the left-hand column is the area or areas of differentiation within each topic.
After being randomly presented with one of the five supply chain
disclosures, we asked each respondent the following question: “On a scale of 0 (not
at all committed) to 100 (extremely committed), how confident do you feel that this
company is making an effort to prevent and root out slavery and human trafficking
in its supply chain?”

130

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43(c)(3).
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Table 4: Differences between Optimal and Minimal Policies

Optimal

Minimal

– # of Suppliers Audited

x all direct
suppliers

x a sample of
direct suppliers

– Frequency of Audits

x once a year

x (no mention)

– Use of a Third Party

x third-party
auditors

x internal auditors

– Frequency of Audits

x third-party
auditors

x internal auditors

– Announcement of Audits

x unannounced
audits

x announced audits

– Number of Suppliers

x all direct
suppliers

x a sample of
direct suppliers

x require suppliers
to certify

x request suppliers
to certify

x termination of
relationship with
supplier

x (no mention of
consequence)

x mitigating risks
of human
trafficking and
slavery within
the company’s
supply chains

x importance of
respecting
human rights

Verification

Supplier Audits

Certification
– Policy on Certification

Internal Accountability
– Result of a Supplier’s
Failure to Take Action on
Non-Compliance
Training
– Topic of Training
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2. Results
Figure 4 reports the results of our primary experiment.131 The dots represent
the mean response and the lines represent the 95% confidence interval for each of the
five treatment groups. Dots further to the left (or right) represent less (or more)
confidence in the hypothetical company’s efforts to eradicate slavery and human
trafficking in its supply chain.
Figure 4: Primary Experimental Results
1. General Statement

2. Basic Statement - Optimal

3. Basic Statement - Minimal

4. Best Practice - Optimal

5. Best Practice - Minimal
10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Confidence in Company's Efforts (0 = Not at All / 100 = Extremely)

The results in Figure 4 produce several important insights. First, and most
notably, the average responses for all of the disclosures fell in a narrow range. On a
scale of 0 to 100, all five disclosures scored within a 10-point range: the (4) Best
Practice – Optimal disclosure received an average score of 75, and the (3)
Basic – Minimal disclosure received an average score of 65. Moreover, the
disclosure that was completely non-compliant—the General Statement—received
the median average score of 67.132
Second, our experiment was designed to evaluate whether the mandated
format of CTSCA disclosures—that is, including the five required topics—improves
consumer confidence compared to more general disclosures that report a company’s
broad commitment to human rights. To test this, one of the disclosures used as a
treatment was a general statement that the California Attorney General’s office
specifically indicated as not covering the topics required by the CTSCA. The mean
response for respondents given the General Statement was 67 (95% CI: 65, 70).
131
Appendix C provides tables that report the results presented in Figures 4–7. Because our
treatment was randomized (and balance testing does not reveal any imbalance across the treatment
groups), we simply report the differences in means for the five treatment groups. In regression results
reported in Appendix D, we estimate an OLS regression while controlling for the demographic variables
in Table 1. The results when doing so are substantively the same as the results in Figure 4.
132
The Basic Practice – Optimal Disclosure received an average score of 69, and the Best
Practice – Minimal received a 67.
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The mean responses for both groups that were given the basic compliant statements
were comparable. The mean response for the participants that were given the
Basic – Optimal disclosure was 69 (95% CI: 67, 72) and the mean response for the
Basic – Minimal disclosure was 65 (95% CI: 62, 68). The difference between the
General Statement and these two treatments was not statistically significant. These
results illustrate that a company that minimally complies with the CTSCA does not
garner more confidence from consumers than a company that issues a general (noncompliant) statement on its commitment to respecting the human rights of its
employees.
Third, our experiment was designed to evaluate whether consumers are
likely to have greater confidence in companies that make optimal efforts to eradicate
slavery and human trafficking in their supply chains, as compared to those that make
minimal efforts to do so. To test this, our treatments included examples of disclosures
reporting that companies were engaging in optimal and minimal efforts for each of
the topics required by the CTSCA. The results in Figure 4 reveal that for both the
basic and best practice disclosures, the participants reported higher levels of
confidence in response to the “optimal” disclosures. For the basic disclosure,
however, the difference is substantively small and far from statistically significant.
This suggests that companies that report comprehensive efforts to mitigate human
rights risks within their supply chains are not necessarily perceived better by
consumers as compared to companies that report only minimal efforts.
Fourth, our experiment was designed to evaluate whether disclosures
following the best practice guidelines promulgated by the State of California: (1)
improve consumer confidence, and (2) make it easier for consumers to tell the
difference between a company that reports that it undertakes comprehensive supply
due diligence and one that reports minimal efforts to mitigate human rights risks in
its supply chain. The results presented in Figure 4 suggest that the respondents that
are given the Best Practice – Optimal disclosure report a higher level of confidence
as compared to all the other treatments in a statistically significant way. Moreover,
the gap between the Best Practice – Optimal treatment and the Best
Practice – Minimal treatment is greater than the gap between the two basic
treatments. That said, it is slightly troubling that the Basic – Optimal and Best
Practice – Minimal disclosures score almost exactly the same (69 and 67,
respectively) on a 100-point scale. In other words, if a company conducting a low
level of due diligence simply frames its policies in the best practice format, it would
potentially receive as much credit from consumers as a company with a high level of
due diligence that does not adhere to the best practice (longer and more detailed)
model.
C. Additional Tests
In addition to the primary experiment reported in the previous section, our
survey also included three other tests of how respondents reacted to supply chain
disclosures. In this section, we report the results of each of these tests.
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1. Influence of Disclosures on Comprehension
In addition to testing how the disclosures influenced consumer confidence,
we also wanted to know how well the respondents comprehended the disclosures. As
a result, after the respondents were asked a few unrelated demographic questions, we
then asked the respondents five questions about the content of the disclosures.
Table 5: Comprehension Questions

Auditor Identity
Audit Frequency
Notice
Training
Conflict Minerals

Who did it say conducted the audits?
How often are the audits conducted?
How much warning are suppliers given before the
audits occur?
What did it say the company provides training on?
What did it say the company is doing to make sure
conflict minerals are not used in its supply chain?

Table 5 lists the five comprehension questions that we posed to our
respondents. To eliminate the possibility of any ordering effects, these five questions
were presented in random order. For each of the five questions, we presented
respondents with four answer choices. One of the four answer choices for each
question was that the disclosure did not mention the topic.
It is important to note that the correct answer was not the same for all of the
treatment groups. For example, for the respondents that received the General
Statement, it was correct to answer all five questions by saying that the disclosure did
not mention the topic. As another example, for the respondents that received the
Optimal treatments it was correct to say that “A Third Party” conducted the audits,
but for the respondents that received the Minimal treatments it was correct to say that
“An Internal Team of Auditors” conducted the audits.
Figure 5 presents the mean number (and 95% confidence interval) of
comprehension questions that the respondents in each of the treatment groups
answered correctly. The results are noteworthy in two particular ways.
First, the respondents that received the General Statement disclosure
correctly answered the most questions: 2.88 (95% CI: 2.70, 3.60). As previously
noted, this is perhaps unsurprising because the correct answer for each question for
respondents that received this treatment was that the disclosure did not mention the
topic. Notice, however, that respondents that were presented with just this short
statement still provided on average an incorrect answer 2 out of 5 times.
Second, the respondents that received the Basic Statement – Optimal
disclosure answered more questions correctly than the respondents that received
either of the Best Practice treatments. These differences were both highly statistically
significant (p < 0.001). The respondents that received this treatment answered 2.39
(95% CI: 2.25, 2.53) questions correct, compared to 1.87 (90% CI: 1.76, 1.97) for the
Best Practice – Optimal treatment and 1.54 (90% CI: 1.42, 1.65) for respondents that
received the Best Practice – Minimal treatment. In other words, the recipients of the
Best Practice treatment knew less about the content of the treatments than
respondents that received a basic disclosure. This result suggests that the best
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practice guidance promulgated by the California government is not achieving its
intended result of enhancing consumer comprehension.
Figure 5: Comprehension Questions Correctly Answered

1. General Statement
2. Basic Statement - Optimal
3. Basic Statement - Minimal
4. Best Practice - Optimal
5. Best Practice - Minimal
1

2

3

4

5

Number of Correct Comprehension Questions (Out of 5)

2. Views on Actual Disclosures
One concern with our primary experiment is that we asked respondents to
evaluate artificial disclosures that we designed for our study. It would be reasonable
to be concerned that the disclosures we designed might not accurately reflect the kind
of language and claims that actual companies report. As a result, we also used real
disclosures to test how confident respondents were in the efforts that companies were
taking to eradicate human rights abuses.
More specifically, we conducted two additional tests that used real CTSCA
disclosures: Half of our respondents were randomly presented with the test we
discuss in this section, and the other half of the respondents were presented with the
test presented in the next section (Part III.D.3).133
For these additional tests, we identified two large apparel companies
operating in the United States that have made disclosures under the CTSCA. We
specifically selected two companies that sell similar clothing and are frequently
identified as direct competitors. Since our goal was to test whether consumers were
able to identify the company with the better disclosure, we also specifically selected
one company—which we refer to as “Mystery Corp.”—that has a “bad” disclosure
and one company—that we refer to as “Anonymous Corp.”—that has a “good”

133
See Appendix A for a graphic illustration of the survey flow. We presented the respondents
with only one of these two additional tests for two reasons. First, both tests asked respondents to evaluate
the same set of real CTSCA disclosures, so it would not be possible to complete both tests. Second, we
did not want our survey to be excessively long.
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disclosure. Our categorization of the two companies was based on several factors
including: (1) Mystery primarily relies on internal auditors while Anonymous uses
third-party auditors; (2) Mystery’s audits are both announced and unannounced while
those by Anonymous are only unannounced (within a broad window of time); and
(3) there is no indication of the frequency of Mystery’s audits while those by
Anonymous occur once per year.
For the first additional test, we presented respondents with both
disclosures.134 To avoid any ordering effects, we randomized the order that the
disclosures were presented. After being shown both disclosures, the respondents
were asked: “How confident do you feel that both of these companies are making
the best effort to prevent and root out slavery and human trafficking in their supply
chain?” They were then asked to rank both companies on a scale from 0 (not at all
confident) to 100 (extremely confident).
Figure 6: Confidence After Reading Actual Disclosures

1. Mystery

2. Anonymous

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Confidence in Company's Efforts (0 = Not at All / 100 = Extremely)
Figure 6 presents the results of this experimental test. The respondents rated
the statement from Mystery Corp. with an average score of 67.52 (90% CI: 65.90,
69.14) and the statement from Anonymous Corp. with an average score of 70.26
(90% CI: 68.60, 71.92). Although this difference is statistically significant at the
0.05 level (p = 0.02), substantively it is quite small. On a scale of 0 to 100,
respondents rated the “good” statement only three points better than the bad
statement. This is despite the fact that the good statement exhibits more
comprehensive supply chain due diligence, particularly its use of unannounced, thirdparty audits. As a result, although it is reassuring that the respondents agreed with
our assessment regarding which statement is better, the narrow gap between the two
statements suggests that consumers did not identify a dramatic difference between
the two—despite the fact that one company reported a much lower level of due
diligence as compared to the other company.
134
Half of the respondents were shown versions of these disclosures with the company’s names
replaced with “Mystery” and “Anonymous”; the other half of the respondents were shown versions of
these disclosures that included the company’s name. This is because our next experiment required
disclosing the company name, and we wanted to be sure the relative responses to the disclosures were
consistent (which they were) regardless of whether the consumers knew the identity of the companies.
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3. Reported Influence on Purchasing Decisions
As previously noted, one of the things we would ideally like to know is
whether consumers change their purchasing decisions as a consequence of supply
chain disclosures. Although we are not able to directly test this with a survey
experiment, we did try to test the effect that supply chain disclosures have on selfreported purchasing decisions.
To do so, the half of respondents that were given this experimental test were
asked how likely they were to purchase a product from either Mystery Corp. or
Anonymous Corp. in the next year on a scale of 0 to 100.135 To be clear, each
respondent given this additional test was only asked about one company. After
providing an answer, we then presented the respondents with the disclosure from the
company they were asked about, and asked them again how likely they were to
purchase a product from the company in the next year. This allowed us to measure
whether respondents claimed to be more or less interested in purchasing a product
from the company after seeing the quality of its supply chain disclosure.
7. Reported Influence on Purchasing Decisions

1. Mystery - Before

2. Mystery - After

3. Anonymous - Before

4. Anonymous - After
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Confidence in Company's Efforts (0 = Not at All / 100 = Extremely)
Figure 7 presents the results of this test. There are two points worth noting
about the results. First, the respondents that were asked about both companies
claimed to be more likely to buy products from the companies after having been
presented with the disclosures. What is interesting about this result, however, is that
the disclosure for Mystery Corp. did not reveal a high level of due diligence. In other
words, even when shown a disclosure reporting minimal efforts by a company to root
out human rights abuses within its supply chain, the respodnents nevertheless had a
positive reaction to the statement.
Second, the respondents shown the Anonymous Corp. statement—which
reports higher levels of due diligence as compared to the Mystery Corp. statement—
did exhibit a larger increase in their stated willingness to buy the product after being
135

The respondents were presented with the actual names of the companies.
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shown the statement. Respondents shown the Mystery Corp. statement reported
being nine percentage points more likely to buy a product after having read the
statement, whereas respondents shown the Anonymous Corp. statement reported
being thirteen percentage points more likely. This difference is statistically
significant at the 0.05 level (p = 0.01). This provides some additional evidence that
respondents react moderately more positively to supply chain disclosures that report
higher levels of due diligence.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Given the growing use of disclosure laws as a mechanism to hold companies
accountable for human rights abuses abroad, our examination of the first such law
aimed at consumers offers lessons for future policymaking and contributes to the
disclosure regulation literature.
A. Summary of Results
Taken together, our experimental tests of supply chain disclosures produced
several clear findings. The result that should be most reassuring for advocates of
supply chain disclosure regimes is that respondents did consistently have the most
confidence in disclosures that reported the highest levels of due diligence. In the
primary experiment, the Best Practice – Optimal disclosure was rated the highest by
respondents. In addition, in the two experimental tests where respondents were asked
to evaluate real disclosures, the disclosure we had previously identified as reporting
higher levels of due diligence (the “Anonymous Corp.” disclosure) performed better.
This gives some confidence that consumers may be able to interpret the relative value
of supply chain disclosures.
There were two other results, however, that paint a less optimistic picture.
First, the respondents consistently rated disclosures that either contained no
information136 or reported low levels of due diligence137 almost as highly as
disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence. The substantive effects of the
treatments were small in these experimental tests, which suggests that companies
may receive little benefit from consumers for engaging in expensive and timeconsuming due diligence.
Second, the respondents that were presented with Best Practice disclosures
correctly answered fewer comprehension questions. This suggests that the
consumers may not be responding to the content of the disclosures, but simply
responding to the fact that the Best Practice disclosures were longer (similarly, the
Anonymous Corp. disclosure was slightly longer than the Mystery Corp. disclosure).
If the respondents do not understand the content of the best practice disclosures any
better, it may call into question the value of pushing companies to adopt these
regimes.

For example, the “General Statement” treatment in the primary experiment.
For example, the minimal disclosures in the primary experiment or the Mystery Corp. disclosure
in the additional tests.
136
137
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B. Limitations of Our Research
Before discussing the implications of our research, however, it is important
to acknowledge that our method has several limitations. First, it is possible that the
respondents that completed our survey and experiment are different than the
consumers that supply chain disclosures are directed at. This could be true if supply
chain disclosures are aimed at communicating information to a select core of
interested consumers and not the overall population.
Second, the respondents that completed our survey and experiment were
presented with information in an artificial environment. If consumers were to
encounter supply chain disclosures while researching companies and products, they
might behave differently than respondents who were presented the information
during an academic survey.
Third, we should note that our empirical study of the CTSCA does not
measure the actual effectiveness of supply chain disclosure laws in influencing the
purchasing decisions of consumers and changing corporate behavior. Since the law
only recently went into effect, more time is needed before researchers can evaluate
its implementation.
Fourth, although our results provide some reasons to be pessimistic about
consumers’ ability to interpret the information provided in CTSCA disclosures, those
disclosures still may have an effect. For example, it is possible that non-profit
organizations like KnowTheChain may be able to present the information in ways
that consumers are better able to understand. Additionally, even if consumers have
difficulty assessing companies’ efforts to mitigate human rights risks in corporate
supply chains, the requirement to post a disclosure may compel companies to
examine and eventually improve their practices.
C. Implications & Agenda for Future Research
Despite these limitations, our research suggests several important policy
implications and directions for future research. First, our data suggest that simply
passing a law does not ensure that companies will comply. Our analysis of the
observational data we collected revealed that 52% of companies fully complied with
their obligation to post CTSCA disclosures. This suggests that if policy makers want
companies to comply with disclosure requirements, enforcement efforts likely need
to be strengthened in order to incentivize companies to comply. For example, the
remedy for failure to comply with the CTSCA is an action brought by the Attorney
General of California for injunctive relief. However, the Attorney General of
California has thus far not brought any actions.138 If government officials feel that
formally bringing an action against companies is not desirable policy, the government
could alternatively publicly shame companies by publicizing a list of firms that fail
to post disclosures or report on all five required topics in their disclosures.
Additionally, a key finding from our experiment reveals that governmentissued best practice guidelines may not make it easier for consumers to tell the
difference between companies that are making optimal and minimal efforts to
138

See supra text accompanying note 71.
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eradicate risks to human rights within their supply chains. In the case of the CTSCA,
the Office of the California Attorney General issued a resource guide in 2015 that
“intended to help covered companies by offering recommendations about model
disclosures and best practices for developing such disclosures.”139 According to the
resource guide, companies using best practice disclosures are going beyond
compliance to “more fully educate the public about the integrity of their supply
chains.”140 Model disclosures thus aim to enhance consumers’ understanding of
companies’ anti-trafficking efforts.
However, our research demonstrates that the best practice disclosures do not
in fact enhance consumers’ understanding of company activities. In fact, among
respondents presented with Basic and Best Practice disclosures, there was not a
statistically significant difference between their reactions to the Basic – Optimal
disclosure and the Best Practice – Minimal disclosure. While consumers do care if a
company violates human rights and are concerned about the human rights of
employees in corporate supply chains, it appears that they may simply use length of
disclosures as a proxy for quality. They may assume that a long disclosure that
follows best practice recommendations necessarily reflects that a company is making
an optimal effort to mitigate human rights risks within its supply chain. What may
be most striking is that the one non-compliant disclosure, simply including a brief
general statement of the company’s support of human rights, fared as well as the Best
Practice – Minimal disclosure and almost as well as the Basic – Optimal disclosure.
This result suggests that consumers are not able to appropriately differentiate
between the quality of the efforts a company is undertaking, or even whether a
company is being compliant or not.
In addition to these two issues—that is, a low level of compliance and the
fact that the best practice guidelines do not seem to improve consumer
understanding—our research also calls into question the wisdom of trusting
companies to disclose information about their own activities. As part of our survey,
we also asked respondents to rate how much they would trust different sources of
information about a company’s supply chain. The results of this question are
presented in Figure 8.

139
140

CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 8, at i.
Id. at 1.
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Figure 8: Reported Trust in Potential Sources of Information

Information from the Company
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List from Government
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1 = Trust the Least / 5 = Trust the Most

As Figure 8 clearly shows, the source of information considered least
trustworthy by the public is information disclosed by companies. This suggests that
although asking companies to disclose information may be the cheapest form of
regulation, it is also perhaps the least likely to improve consumer confidence
(assuming that the information disclosed by the company is not independently
verified by a third party).
Given the limitations in the CTSCA that our research reveals, is there any
hope in targeting human rights-related supply chain disclosures at consumers?
Scholars have claimed that that there is in fact consumer demand for ethical
products,141 and our research seems to support this. Empirical studies have
demonstrated a positive relationship between observed sales and/or prices of goods,
and their ethical characteristics.142 For instance, a field experiment on eBay found

141
A 1999 poll by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that about 80% of individuals
said they were willing to pay more for an item if assured it was made under good working conditions.
See KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE UNDER
GLOBALIZATION? 28 (2003); Pat Auger et al., What Will Consumers Pay for Social Product Features?,
42 J. BUS. ETHICS 281 (2003); Patrick De Pelsmacker et al., Do Consumers Care about Ethics?
Willingness to Pay for Fair-Trade Coffee, 39 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 361 (2005); Marsha A. Dickson,
Utility of No Sweat Labels for Apparel Consumers: Profiling Label Users and Predicting Their Purchase,
35 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 96 (2001); Shareen Hertel et al., Human Rights and Public Opinion: From
Attitudes to Action, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 443 (2009); Michael J. Hiscox & Nicholas F.B. Smyth, Is There
Consumer Demand for Improved Labor Standards? Evidence from Field Experiments in Social Product
Labeling (Apr. 22, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1820642; Maria L. Loureiro & Justus Lotade, Do Fair
Trade and Eco-Labels in Coffee Wake Up the Consumer Conscience?, 53 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 129
(2005); Lois A. Mohr & Deborah J. Webb, The Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility and Price on
Consumer Responses, 39 J. CONSUMER AFF. 121 (2005).
142
Teisl et al. examined scanner data on U.S. retail sales of canned tuna and found that market
share (relative to other canned seafood and meat) rose substantially after the introduction of the “dolphinsafe” label in April 1990. Mario F. Teisl et al., Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from DolphinSafe Labeling, 43 J. ENVT’L ECON. & MGMT. 339 (2002).
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that shoppers paid a 23% premium for Fair Trade labeled versus unlabeled coffees.143
Thus, there is evidence that some consumers have displayed a preference for
information about the ethical practices of companies, and have used that information
to shape their buying behavior. Given that backdrop, supply chain disclosure regimes
provide information that a subset of consumers reportedly care about, as our own
research demonstrates as well.
Figure 9: Concern About Aspects of Products

Price
Human Rights of Employees
Quality
Enviromental Impact
Where the Product was Made
1

2

3

4

5

1 = Care the Least / 5 = Care the Most

Figure 9 reports the results of our question that asked respondents how much
they care about different factors when buying a product. Specifically, we asked
respondents: “How much do you care about the following factors when buying a
product?” We then asked respondents to rate five items on a scale from 1 to 5, where
1 represents the least amount of care and 5 is a high degree of care. The respondents
reported caring a significant amount about the price of the product and the quality of
the product. The mean score for the price of the product is 3.52 and the mean score
for the quality of the product is 3.89. Out of the remaining factors, respondents
reported caring most about the human rights of the employees making the product
(the mean score is 3.13), as compared to the environmental impact of the product (the
mean score is 2.66) and where the product was made (the mean score is 2.47).
In light of potential consumer demand for human rights-related information
on products, future research is needed to determine how supply chain disclosure laws
can be improved. There are a variety of possible options that could be considered.
For instance, instead of issuing model disclosures, governments can design and test
a uniform template that companies would be required to use.144 A standard form
could include a limited number of questions—for instance, “do you use unannounced

143
Michael J. Hiscox et al., Consumer Demand for Fair Trade: New Evidence from a Field
Experiment Using eBay Auctions of Fresh Roasted Coffee 1 (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811783.
144
See Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 404.
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audits?” and “do you use a third-party verifier?” A uniform template could aid
consumer comprehension and facilitate comparison across companies.
Another option is to present disclosures at the point of sale, rather than rely
on consumers to seek out the information on corporate websites. These types of
disclosures, referred to as “targeted transparency,” mandate information at the time
of decision-making in order to “nudge” consumer behavior.145 Targeted disclosures
may necessitate a rating system whereby the government or a third party converts
disclosed information into a grade or label (e.g., a trafficking-free label) that is
presented to consumers at the time of purchase.146 This information could also be
available to consumers through apps, several of which already provide information
on companies’ ethical practices.147 In fact, the G7 recently released a statement in
support of responsible supply chains that calls for the development of “impartial tools
[such as relevant apps] to help consumers and public procurers . . . compare
information on the validity and credibility of social and environmental product
labels.”148
In considering whether to add a labeling requirement to disclosure laws,
policymakers need to tread carefully given the D.C. Circuit Court’s recent conflict
minerals ruling. In August 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that the labeling requirement in section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act
(whereby companies must report on whether or not their products are “conflict-free”)
was considered “compelled speech” in violation of the First Amendment.149 The
ruling, however, upheld the remainder of the disclosure requirements within the
conflict minerals due diligence and reporting regime.
Governments can also develop and release a list of “slave-free” companies
or “dirty” companies, which could influence not only consumers but also
governments’ own contracting decisions. A similar mechanism has been used by the
Brazilian government, which updates a “dirty list” of companies that use slave
labor.150 Firms on this list pay a series of fines and cannot obtain credit from the
government or private banks.151 They are also boycotted by those who have signed
up to a National Pact for the Eradication of Slave Labor.152 Companies on the “dirty
list” have two years to clean up their supply chains before being given the opportunity
to get off the list.

145
See RICHARD M. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); FUNG, GRAHAM & WEL, supra note 14, at 39–46.
146
For an analysis of rating systems based on an empirical study of restaurant sanitation grading,
see Ho, supra note 14.
147
Existing apps that monitor human rights within corporate supply chains include Free2Work
(www.free2work.org),
GoodGuide
(www.goodguide.com),
and
Slavery
Footprint
(www.slaveryfootprint.org).
148
Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, G-7 Leaders’ Declaration in
Schloss Emau, Germany (June 8, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/08/g-7leaders-declaration.
149
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
150
See Annie Kelly, Brazil’s “Dirty List” Names and Shames Companies Involved in Slave
Labour, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/brazil-dirtylist-names-shames-slave-labour.
151
Id.
152
See National Pact for the Eradication of Slave Labor, INT’L LABOR ORG. (2005),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---ilowashington/documents/genericdocument/wcms_189835.pdf.
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Finally, it may be worth entirely reconsidering the wisdom of trying to
reduce slavery and human trafficking through the use of mandatory disclosure
regimes. As previously noted, research in other areas has questioned the value of
disclosure regimes.153 Our research suggests that, although consumers may care
about human rights, it is not clear that supply chain disclosures will help them make
more informed decisions. After all, simply posting information about supply chain
audits on company websites does not necessarily lead to changes in consumer
behavior.
The one thing that is clear from our study is that further research is needed
to test the effectiveness of these options before designing future supply chain
regulations. Disclosure requirements and best practice guidelines should be drafted
based on empirical evidence of what would most effectively communicate relevant
information to consumers. It is important to keep in mind that providing more
information may have the unintended consequence of inhibiting consumer
comprehension. In addition, given the difficulty of interpreting human rights
disclosures, more research is also needed on: (1) which factors (e.g., a company’s
industry, the country in which it operates, or the number of its suppliers) have the
largest impact on the risk of human rights violations in corporate supply chains; (2)
the relationship between these factors and actual human rights outcomes; (3) which
aspects of due diligence are most likely to minimize potential human rights risks; and
(4) the likelihood that such information would in fact shape consumer purchasing
decisions in the field. Such research is necessary before more countries follow in the
steps of the United Kingdom in passing supply chain disclosure laws that model the
flawed CTSCA.
CONCLUSION
In response to growing concern over corporate complicity in human rights
abuses, laws have been adopted—and are currently being proposed—that require
companies to disclose their efforts to mitigate human rights risks in their supply
chains. To date, however, these laws have been subject to little empirical scrutiny.
In this Article, we argued that the effectiveness of supply chain disclosure regimes is
likely to be limited. This is not only because disclosure regimes in other contexts
have been shown to be frequently ineffective, but also because unique features of
supply chain disclosures make them especially difficult to interpret. In order to test
our argument, we administered a series of experimental tests designed to measure
consumers’ confidence and comprehension of supply chain disclosures to a
nationally representative sample of respondents. Although there were some positive
findings for advocates of supply chain disclosure regimes, the respondents
consistently rated disclosures reporting low levels of due diligence almost as highly
as disclosures that reported a high level of due diligence. In other words, our
experimental results are broadly consistent with our theory.
We believe that the evidence presented in this study suggests that it may be
time to reconsider the design of current supply chain disclosure laws, especially given
the recently passed U.K. law modeled after the CTSCA and current efforts to pass
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See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13.
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similar laws on the federal level and in Australia.154 Although consumers may be
interested in whether a company’s supply chain is free from human rights abuses,
current corporate disclosures do not help consumers determine which companies are
making comprehensive efforts to achieve that goal. Taken together, our results thus
suggest that the current disclosure regimes have serious limitations. Although the
goal of improving corporate human rights practices is admirable, the current
disclosure regimes are not a well-designed way to achieve it.

154

See sources cited supra note 9.
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APPENDIX A – FLOW OF THE SURVEY

Figure: Illustration of the Flow of the Survey Experiment
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APPENDIX B – TEXT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENTS
1. General Statement
Our company is committed to respecting the human rights of our employees. Our
Code of Ethics and company policies adhere to the principles of free choice of
employment, nondiscrimination, and humane treatment. We ensure compliance with
regulations governing child labor, minimum wage, and maximum working hour
limitations.
2. Basic – Optimal Disclosure
Verification
We conduct assessments of all of our direct suppliers once a year to verify that they
are not at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws. Third party
auditors spearhead the verification process using a multi-level process to identify and
evaluate potential risks.
Supplier Audits
Third party auditors conduct unannounced audits of all of our direct suppliers once a
year to evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery and human trafficking
company standards.
Certification
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-slavery and
human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which they do business.
Internal Accountability
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for employees
and contractors failing to meet our company standards regarding slavery and
trafficking. If and when our company uncovers employee or contractor compliance
problems, we provide written notice and a specified period of time to take corrective
action. Failure to take action results in termination of the relationship.
Training
Our company provides employees with training on mitigating the risks of human
trafficking and slavery within our company’s supply chains of products.
3. Basic – Minimal Disclosure
Verification
We conduct assessments of a sample of our direct suppliers to verify that they are not
at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws. Our internal auditors
spearhead the verification process using a multi-level process to identify and evaluate
potential risks.
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Supplier Audits
Our internal auditors conduct announced audits of a sample of our direct suppliers to
evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery and human trafficking company
standards.
Certification
We request our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-slavery and
human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which they do business.
Internal Accountability
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for employees
and contractors failing to meet our company standards regarding slavery and
trafficking. If and when our company uncovers employee or contractor compliance
problems, we provide written notice and suggest corrective actions.
Training
Our company provides employees with training on the importance of respecting the
human rights.
4. Best Practice – Optimal Disclosure
Verification
We conduct assessments of all of our direct suppliers twice a year to verify that they
are not at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws. Third party
auditors spearhead the verification process using a multi-level process to identify and
evaluate potential risks. Prior to partnering with any new suppliers, and twice a year
thereafter, our monitor conducts an initial screening of those suppliers. During the
next level of review, our monitor requires prospective and current suppliers to
respond in writing to questions regarding areas of concern raised during the initial
screening process. The monitor then assesses which suppliers pose the highest risk
in human trafficking, and reports these findings to our executive management team.
Supplier Audits
Third party auditors conduct unannounced audits of all of our direct suppliers twice
a year to evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery and human trafficking
company standards. Audits consist of individual and group interviews with
supervisors and management, as well as exhaustive facility tours. We monitor
supplier behavior and compliance through the use of a professional third-party
auditing firm, which performs extensive unannounced investigations.
Certification
We require our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-slavery and
human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which they do business. Our
partners must produce records to our company. Such records include: (1) proof of
age for every worker; (2) every employee’s payroll records and timesheets; (3)
written documentation of terms and conditions of employment; (4) local health and
safety evaluations or documentation of exemption from law; and (5) records of
employee grievances and suggestions, and any employer responses.
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Internal Accountability
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for employees
and contractors failing to meet our company standards regarding slavery and
trafficking. In the last year, our team conducted visits to all of our supplier factories
to audit internal grievance mechanisms. We evaluated the existing communication
channels in these factories and assessed their adequacy, reviewing the frequency of
grievances reported and resolved. Auditors work with employees and contractors to
develop action plans to resolve any such instances of non-compliance. If and when
our company uncovers employee or contractor compliance problems, we provide
written notice and a specified period of time to take corrective action. Failure to take
action
results
in
termination
of
the
relationship.
Training
Our company provides employees with training on mitigating the risks of human
trafficking and slavery within our company’s supply chains of products. Last
summer, we conducted a three-day annual seminar for our employees and managers
who are directly responsible for selecting and overseeing our suppliers. Our supply
chain management staff consists of two vice-presidents and one operations manager.
5. Best Practice – Minimal Disclosure
Verification
We conduct assessments of a sample of our direct suppliers to verify that they are not
at risk for violating anti-slavery and human trafficking laws. Our internal auditors
spearhead the verification process using a multi-level process to identify and evaluate
potential risks. Prior to partnering with any new suppliers, our monitor conducts an
initial screening of those suppliers. During the next level of review, our monitor
requests prospective and current suppliers to respond in writing to questions
regarding areas of concern raised during the initial screening process. The monitor
then assesses which suppliers pose the highest risk in human trafficking, and reports
these findings to our executive management team.
Supplier Audits
Our internal auditors conduct announced audits of a sample of our direct suppliers to
evaluate their compliance with our anti-slavery and human trafficking company
standards. Audits consist of individual and group interviews with supervisors and
management, as well as exhaustive facility tours. We monitor supplier behavior and
compliance through the use of our own internal auditing team, which performs
announced investigations.
Certification
We request our direct suppliers to certify that they comply with anti-slavery and
human trafficking laws in the country or countries in which they do business. Our
partners are asked to produce records to our company. Such records include: (1)
proof of age for every worker; (2) every employee’s payroll records and timesheets;
(3) written documentation of terms and conditions of employment; (4) local health
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and safety evaluations or documentation of exemption from law; and (5) records of
employee grievances and suggestions, and any employer responses.
Internal Accountability
We have developed internal accountability standards and procedures for employees
and contractors failing to meet our company standards regarding slavery and
trafficking. Our team has conducted visits to a sample of our supplier factories to
audit internal grievance mechanisms. We evaluated the existing communication
channels in these factories and assessed their adequacy, reviewing the frequency of
grievances reported and resolved. Auditors work with employees and contractors to
develop action plans to resolve any such instances of non-compliance. If and when
our company uncovers employee or contractor compliance problems, we provide
written notice and suggest corrective actions.
Training
Our company provides employees with training on the importance of respecting the
human rights. Last summer, we conducted a one-day annual seminar for our
employees and managers who are directly responsible for selecting and overseeing
our suppliers.
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APPENDIX C – TABLES OF THE RESULTS FROM THE EXPERIMENTS
Figure 4 - Mean Responses and 95% Confidence Intervals

General
Statement
67.04
(64.53, 69.55)

Basic
– Optimal
Disclosure
69.73
(67.14, 72.33)

Basic
– Minimal
Disclosure
65.06
(62.14, 67.99)

Best Practice
– Optimal
Disclosure
75.16
(72.87, 77.46)

Best Practice
– Minimal
Disclosure
66.84
(64.23, 69.44)

Figure 5 - Mean Responses and 95% Confidence Intervals

General
Statement
2.88
(2.70, 3.06)

Basic
– Optimal
Disclosure
2.39
(2.25, 2.53)

Basic
– Minimal
Disclosure
1.80
(1.67, 1.93)

Best Practice
– Optimal
Disclosure
1.87
(1.76, 1.97)

Best Practice
– Minimal
Disclosure
1.54
(1.43, 1.65)

Figure 6 - Mean Responses and 95% Confidence Intervals

Mystery
Corp.
67.52
(65.90, 69.14)

Anonymous
Corp.
70.26
(68.60, 71.92)

Figure 7 - Mean Responses and 95% Confidence Intervals

Mystery
Corp.
-Before
40.66
(37.44, 43.88)

Mystery
Corp.
-After
49.58
(46.37, 52.79)

Anonymous
Corp.
-Before
32.27
(29.05, 35.50)

Anonymous
Corp.
-After
45.17
(41.77, 48.57)
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APPENDIX D – OLS MODEL FOR THE PRIMARY EXPERIMENT

Constant
Basic - Optimal
Basic - Minimal
Best Practice - Optimal
Best Practice - Minimal
Gender - Male
Age - 25-34
Age - 35-44
Age - 45-54
Age - 55-64
Age - 65+
Race/Ethnicity - Hispanic
Race/Ethnicity - Black
Race/Ethnicity - Asian
Race/Ethnicity - Other

Model 1
67.268***
(1.267)
2.466
(1.832)
-1.720
(1.830)
8.1615***
(1.803)
0.247
(1.786)

Model 2
65.546***
(2.396)
2.306
(1.837)
-1.378
(1.836)
8.265***
(1.807)
0.468
(1.796)
1.096
(1.172)
0.530
(2.034)
2.111
(2.061)
2.396
(2.094)
-1.007
(2.107)
0.229
(2.162)
-5.365*
(2.101)
0.133
(1.850)
-4.281
(2.803)
-8.764*
(4.229)
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Region - Midwest
Region - South
Region - West
1405
Observations
-- Standard errors in parentheses.
-- *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, ** p <0.01.
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1.290
(1.822)
0.888
(1.656)
2.453
(1.836)
1401

